نظام تجاري متعدد الأطراف قائم على القواعد

مبادئ النظام التجاري.

إن اتفاقيات منظمة التجارة العالمية طويلة ومعقدة لأنها نصوص قانونية تغطي مجموعة واسعة من الأنشطة. وهي تتعامل مع: الزراعة، والمنسوجات والملابس، والخدمات المصرفية، والاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية، والمشتريات الحكومية، والمعايير الصناعية وسلامة المنتجات، وأنظمة الصرف الصحي الغذائي، والملكية الفكرية، وأكثر من ذلك بكثير. ولكن هناك عدد من المبادئ الأساسية البسيطة التي تدور في جميع هذه الوثائق. وهذه المبادئ هي أساس النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف.

وإلقاء نظرة عن كثب على هذه المبادئ:

مزيد من المعلومات التمهيدية.

التجارة دون تمييز.

1 - الدولة الأكثر رعاية: معاملة الأشخاص الآخرين على قدم المساواة بموجب اتفاقات منظمة التجارة العالمية، لا يمكن للبلدان أن تميز عادة بين شركائها التجاريين. منح شخص صالح خاص (مثل انخفاض الرسوم الجمركية معدل واحد من منتجاتها) وعليك أن تفعل الشيء نفسه لجميع أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية الأخرى.

ويعرف هذا المبدأ بمعاملة الدولة الأولى بالرعاية (انظر الإطار). ومن المهم جدا أن تكون المادة الأولى من الاتفاق العام بشأن التعريفات الجمركية والتجارة (غات)، التي تنظم التجارة في السلع. وتشكل الدولة الأولى بالرعاية أيضا أولوية في الاتفاق العام بشأن التجارة في الخدمات (المادة 2) والاتفاق المتعلق بجوانب حقوق الملكية الفكرية المتصلة بالتجارة (المادة 4)، على الرغم من أن المبدأ يتناول في كل اتفاق معاملة مختلفة قليلا . وتغطي هذه الاتفاقات الثلاثة معا مجالات التجارة الرئيسية الثلاثة التي تعالجها منظمة التجارة العالمية.

يسمح ببعض الاستثناءات. فعلى سبيل المثال، يمكن للبلدان أن تنشئ اتفاقا للتجارة الحرة ينطبق فقط على السلع المتداولة داخل المجموعة - التي تميز ضد البضائع من الخارج. أو أنها يمكن أن تعطي البلدان النامية وصولا خاصا إلى أسواقها. أو يمكن لبلد ما أن يرفع الحواجز أمام المنتجات التي تعتبر متداولة بشكل غير عادل من بلدان معينة. وفي الخدمات، يسمح للبلدان، في ظروف محدودة، بالتمييز. ولكن الاتفاقات لا تسمح إلا بهذه الاستثناءات بشروط صارمة. وبصفة عامة، تعني الدولة الأولى بالرعاية أنه في كل مرة يخفض فيها بلد حاجزا تجاريا أو يفتح سوقا، عليه أن يفعل ذلك لنفس السلع أو الخدمات من جميع شركائه التجاريين - سواء كانوا غنيين أو فقراء، ضعفاء أو قويا.

2- المعاملة الوطنية: معاملة الأجانب والسكان المحليين على حد سواء يجب معاملة السلع المستوردة محليا والسلع المنتجة على قدم المساواة - على الأقل بعد دخول السلع الأجنبية إلى السوق. وينطبق نفس الشيء على الخدمات الأجنبية والمحلية، وعلى العلامات التجارية الأجنبية والمحلية وحقوق النشر وبراءات الاختراع. ويوجد مبدأ "المعاملة الوطنية" (الذي يمنح الآخرين نفس المعاملة التي يتمتع بها المواطنون أنفسهم) في جميع الاتفاقات الرئيسية الثلاثة لمنظمة التجارة العالمية (المادة 3 من الاتفاق العام بشأن التعريفات الجمركية والتجارة، والمادة 17 من الاتفاق العام بشأن التجارة في الخدمات، والمادة 3 من اتفاق تريبس)، على الرغم من أن المبدأ يتم التعامل معها بشكل مختلف قليلا في كل من هذه.

لا تنطبق المعاملة الوطنية إلا بعد دخول المنتج أو الخدمة أو بند الملكية الفكرية إلى السوق. ولذلك، فإن فرض رسوم جمركية على الاستيراد لا يشكل انتهاكا للمعاملة الوطنية حتى إذا لم تفرض على المنتجات المنتجة محليا ضريبة معادلة.

التجارة الحرة: تدريجيا، من خلال التفاوض.

ويعتبر تخفيض الحواجز التجارية أحد أكثر الوسائل وضوحا لتشجيع التجارة. وتشمل الحواجز المعنية الرسوم الجمركية (أو التعريفات الجمركية) وتدابير مثل حظر الاستيراد أو الحصص التي تحد من الكميات بشكل انتقائي. ونوقشت أيضا من وقت لآخر قضايا أخرى مثل الروتين وسياسات سعر الصرف.

ومنذ إنشاء مجموعة الغات في الفترة 1947-1947، كانت هناك ثماني جولات من المفاوضات التجارية. وتجري الآن جولة تاسعة، في إطار خطة الدوحة للتنمية. في البداية ركزت على تخفيض الرسوم الجمركية على السلع المستوردة. ونتيجة للمفاوضات، انخفضت معدلات التعريفة الجمركية للبلدان الصناعية في منتصف التسعينيات على السلع الصناعية بشكل مطرد إلى أقل من 4 في المائة.

ولكن بحلول الثمانينيات، توسعت المفاوضات لتشمل الحواجز غير الجمركية على السلع، وإلى المجالات الجديدة مثل الخدمات والملكية الفكرية.

فتح الأسواق يمكن أن تكون مفيدة، ولكنها تتطلب أيضا التكيف. وتسمح اتفاقات منظمة التجارة العالمية للبلدان بإدخال تغييرات تدريجيا، من خلال "التحرير التدريجي". وعادة ما تمنح البلدان النامية وقتا أطول للوفاء بالتزاماتها.

إمكانية التنبؤ: من خلال الربط والشفافية.

وفي بعض األحيان، يمكن أن يكون الوعد بعدم رفع حاجز تجاري مهما بنفس الدرجة، ألن الوعد يعطي الشركات رؤية أوضح لفرصها المستقبلية. مع الاستقرار والقدرة على التنبؤ، يتم تشجيع الاستثمار، يتم إنشاء فرص العمل ويمكن للمستهلكين التمتع الكامل بفوائد المنافسة - اختيار وانخفاض الأسعار. إن النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف هو محاولة من الحكومات لجعل بيئة الأعمال مستقرة ويمكن التنبؤ بها.

وزادت جولة أوروغواي من الارتباطات.

النسب المئوية للتعريفة الجمركية قبل وبعد محادثات 1986-94.

(وهذه هي التعريفات الجمركية، لذلك لا يتم ترجيح النسب المئوية وفقا لحجم التجارة أو قيمتها)

وفي منظمة التجارة العالمية، عندما توافق البلدان على فتح أسواقها للسلع أو الخدمات، فإنها "تلزم" التزاماتها. بالنسبة للسلع، هذه الروابط تصل إلى سقوف على معدلات الرسوم الجمركية. وفي بعض الأحيان تفرض البلدان ضريبة على الواردات بمعدلات أقل من المعدلات المحددة. وكثيرا ما يحدث ذلك في البلدان النامية. وفي البلدان المتقدمة النمو، تكون المعدلات محملة بالفعل والمعدلات المحددة تميل إلى أن تكون هي نفسها.

ويمكن لأي بلد أن يغير روابطه، ولكن فقط بعد التفاوض مع شركائه التجاريين، مما قد يعني تعويضهم عن فقدان التجارة. وكان من بين إنجازات جولة أوروغواي للمفاوضات التجارية المتعددة الأطراف زيادة حجم التجارة بموجب التزامات ملزمة (انظر الجدول). في الزراعة، 100٪ من المنتجات لديها الآن التعريفات ملزمة. ونتيجة كل ذلك: درجة أعلى بكثير من الأمن في السوق للتجار والمستثمرين.

ويحاول النظام تحسين القدرة على التنبؤ والاستقرار بطرق أخرى أيضا. ويتمثل أحد الطرق في تثبيط استخدام الحصص وغيرها من التدابير المستخدمة لوضع حدود لكميات الواردات - يمكن أن تؤدي إدارة الحصص إلى مزيد من الشريط الأحمر والاتهامات باللجوء غير العادل. والهدف الآخر هو جعل القواعد التجارية للبلدان واضحة وعامة ("شفافة") قدر الإمكان. تتطلب العديد من اتفاقيات منظمة التجارة العالمية من الحكومات الكشف عن سياساتها وممارساتها علنا ​​داخل البلد أو بإخطار منظمة التجارة العالمية. وتوفر المراقبة المنتظمة للسياسات التجارية الوطنية من خلال آلية استعراض السياسات التجارية وسيلة أخرى لتشجيع الشفافية على الصعيدين المحلي والدولي على حد سواء.

تشجيع المنافسة العادلة.

ووصفت منظمة التجارة العالمية أحيانا بأنها مؤسسة "تجارة حرة"، ولكنها ليست دقيقة تماما. ويسمح النظام بالتعريفات الجمركية، وفي ظروف محدودة، بأشكال أخرى من الحماية. وبصورة أدق، فهو نظام من القواعد المكرسة للمنافسة المفتوحة والعادلة وغير المشوهة.

والقواعد المتعلقة بعدم التمييز - الدولة الأولى بالرعاية والمعاملة الوطنية - مصممة لضمان شروط عادلة للتجارة. وكذلك تلك المتعلقة بالإغراق (التصدير بأقل من التكلفة للحصول على حصة في السوق) والإعانات. فالقضايا معقدة، وتحاول القواعد تحديد ما هو عادل أو غير عادل، وكيف يمكن للحكومات أن تستجيب، وخاصة عن طريق فرض رسوم إضافية على الواردات محسوبة للتعويض عن الأضرار الناجمة عن التجارة غير العادلة.

ويهدف العديد من اتفاقات منظمة التجارة العالمية الأخرى إلى دعم المنافسة العادلة: في مجالات الزراعة والملكية الفكرية والخدمات، على سبيل المثال. والاتفاق المتعلق بالمشتريات الحكومية (اتفاق "متعدد الأطراف" لأنه وقع عليه عدد قليل فقط من أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية) يوسع قواعد المنافسة لتشتريها آلاف الكيانات الحكومية في كثير من البلدان. وما إلى ذلك وهلم جرا.

• تشجيع التنمية والإصلاح الاقتصادي.

ويسهم نظام منظمة التجارة العالمية في التنمية. ومن ناحية أخرى، تحتاج البلدان النامية إلى المرونة في الوقت الذي تستغرقه لتنفيذ اتفاقات النظام. والاتفاقات نفسها ترث الأحكام السابقة من مجموعة "غات" التي تسمح بتوفير امتيازات خاصة في مجال التجارة والتسهيلات التجارية للبلدان النامية.

وأكثر من ثلاثة أرباع أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية هم من البلدان النامية والبلدان التي تمر بمرحلة انتقال إلى الاقتصادات السوقية. وخلال سبع سنوات ونصف من جولة أوروغواي، نفذ أكثر من 60 بلدا من هذه البلدان برامج تحرير التجارة بصورة مستقلة. وفي الوقت نفسه، كانت البلدان النامية والاقتصادات التي تمر بمرحلة انتقالية أكثر نشاطا وتأثيرا في مفاوضات جولة أوروغواي أكثر مما كانت عليه في أي جولة سابقة، بل كانت أكثر أهمية في جدول أعمال الدوحة الإنمائي الحالي.

وفي نهاية جولة أوروغواي، كانت البلدان النامية مستعدة للوفاء بمعظم الالتزامات المطلوبة من البلدان المتقدمة النمو. غير أن الاتفاقات لم تمنحهم فترات انتقالية للتكيف مع أحكام منظمة التجارة العالمية غير المألوفة وربما الأكثر صعوبة - ولا سيما بالنسبة لأفقر البلدان "الأقل نموا". وقال قرار وزارى تم اعتماده فى نهاية الجولة ان الدول الاكثر فقرا يجب ان تعجل بتنفيذ التزامات الوصول الى الاسواق حول السلع المصدرة من قبل الدول الاقل تقدما وانها تسعى الى زيادة المساعدات الفنية لها. وفي الآونة الأخيرة، بدأت البلدان المتقدمة النمو تسمح بالواردات الخالية من الرسوم الجمركية والحصص بالنسبة لجميع المنتجات تقريبا من أقل البلدان نموا. وعلى كل هذا، لا تزال منظمة التجارة العالمية وأعضائها يمرون بعملية تعلم. وتشمل خطة الدوحة الإنمائية الحالية شواغل البلدان النامية بشأن الصعوبات التي تواجهها في تنفيذ اتفاقات جولة أوروغواي.

يجب أن يكون نظام التداول.

دون تمييز - لا ينبغي لأي بلد أن يميز بين شركائه التجاريين (يمنحهم "الدولة الأكثر رعاية" أو الدولة الأولى بالرعاية على قدم المساواة)؛ وينبغي ألا تميز بين منتجاتها أو خدماتها أو مواطنيها الأجانب (مع منحهم "معاملة وطنية")؛ أكثر حرية - الحواجز التي تنزل عن طريق التفاوض؛ يمكن للشركات الأجنبية والمستثمرين والحكومات أن تكون واثقة من أن الحواجز التجارية (بما في ذلك التعريفات والحواجز غير الجمركية) ينبغي ألا تثار بشكل تعسفي؛ "التعهدات" والالتزامات المتعلقة بفتح الأسواق "ملزمة" في منظمة التجارة العالمية؛ أكثر تنافسية - تثبيط الممارسات "غير العادلة" مثل إعانات التصدير ومنتجات الإغراق بتكلفة أقل للحصول على حصة في السوق؛ وأكثر فائدة للبلدان الأقل تقدما - مما يتيح لها مزيدا من الوقت للتكيف، وزيادة المرونة، والامتيازات الخاصة.

هذا يبدو وكأنه تناقض. وهو يقترح معاملة خاصة، ولكن في منظمة التجارة العالمية يعني في الواقع عدم التمييز - معاملة الجميع تقريبا على قدم المساواة.

هذا ما يحصل. ويعامل كل عضو جميع الأعضاء الآخرين على قدم المساواة مع الشركاء التجاريين "الأكثر تفضيلا". وإذا حسن بلد ما الفوائد التي يمنحها لشريك تجاري واحد، عليه أن يعطي نفس المعاملة "الأفضل" لجميع أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية الآخرين حتى يظلوا جميعا "الأكثر رعاية".

إن حالة الدولة الأكثر رعاية لا تعني دائما المعاملة المتساوية. وأقامت المعاهدات الثنائية الأولى للدولة الأولى بالرعاية نوادا حصرية بين الشركاء التجاريين "الأكثر رعاية" في البلد. وبموجب الاتفاق العام بشأن التعريفات الجمركية والتجارة (غات) والآن منظمة التجارة العالمية، لم يعد نادي الدولة الأولى بالرعاية حصريا. ويكفل مبدأ الدولة الأولى بالرعاية أن يعامل كل بلد أكثر من 140 عضوا من أعضائه على قدم المساواة.

ويتطلب التعقيد المتزايد في العلاقات الاقتصادية الدولية توسيع وتعميق النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف - المدير العام لمنظمة التجارة العالمية.

وأصبحت الافتراضات السياسية الطويلة الأمد للحرب الباردة غير ذات صلة، وقد تغيرت العلاقات بين الشمال والجنوب، التي كانت تهيمن عليها في الماضي في كثير من الأحيان الاستقطاب غير الضروري وحوار الصم، بشكل لا رجعة فيه، & # 148؛ السيد ريناتو روجيرو، المدير العام لمنظمة التجارة العالمية، اليوم (16 تشرين الأول / أكتوبر) في محاضرة بول هنري سباك في جامعة هارفارد في بوسطن بالولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.

وفي خطاب يثير الفكر، رسم السيد روجيرو أهم الجوانب الملحة في جدول الأعمال الحالي والمتوقع الذي يواجه النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف، مؤكدا على ضرورة أن تستوعب منظمة التجارة العالمية طائفة أوسع من المصالح عندما تصبح مؤسسة أكثر شمولا وشمولية.

وكان الهدف الرئيسي هو جلب الصين وروسيا وغيرها من الاقتصادات التي تمر بمرحلة انتقالية إلى النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف بشروط تسهم في عملية إصلاحها الخاصة ولكنها تدعم تماما سلامة النظام. العديد من البلدان النامية قد & كوت؛ التقليل من الفجوة بين الشمال والجنوب القديمة & كوت؛ و & كوت؛ وضع الإيمان في النظام التجاري لمنظمة التجارة العالمية للاستمرارية والاستقرار والوعد بالفرص التجارية & كوت؛ عن طريق التحول نحو سياسات التجارة الليبرالية وزيادة الاعتماد على المنافسة الدولية لتوليد الدخل والنمو. ولكن بالنسبة للبلدان النامية المنخفضة الدخل التي لا تشارك بوضوح في ازدهار عالمي متزايد، تتحمل منظمة التجارة العالمية مسؤولية مشتركة. ويجب على منظمة التجارة العالمية، من جانبها، أن تكفل تمكين هذه البلدان من تنويع إنتاجها من الصادرات وتوسيع أسواقها التصديرية على أساس تنافسي.

وشدد السيد روجيرو على أن إنشاء منظمة التجارة العالمية التاريخي يحتاج إلى تعزيز نظام قوي، في تطور مستمر تماما مثل الاقتصاد العالمي الذي تقوم عليه. وتعتمد مصداقيتها على امتثال الحكومات الأعضاء امتثالا تاما للقواعد والتخصصات والالتزامات المتعلقة بفتح الأسواق الناشئة عن جولة أوروغواي والنجاح في تنفيذ الولاية الداخلية لإجراء المزيد من المفاوضات، ولا سيما في مجال التجارة في الخدمات.

وذهب السيد روجيرو إلى أبعد من ذلك بوضع الخطوط العريضة لجدول الأعمال الجديد المحتمل للقضايا التي أثيرت من خلال العملية الجيوسياسية الأوسع نطاقا للتكامل الاقتصادي العالمي - قضايا مثل التجارة والبيئة والتجارة.

والمعايير الاجتماعية، والمعاملة بالمثل، ومبدأ الدولة الأولى بالرعاية، والنمو الإقليمي والنظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف، وسياسة الاستثمار والمنافسة. & كوت؛ التحديات التي تواجه النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف، & كوت؛ قال السيد روجيرو، & كوت؛ هم أكثر بكثير من قضايا التجارة كما كانوا يعرفون. إن التقاء الأحداث السياسية والاقتصادية في السنوات القليلة الماضية يضعنا على عتبة فرصة تاريخية لإقامة نظام عالمي حقيقي من أجل فعالية إدارة العلاقات الاقتصادية الدولية.

ويرد النص الكامل لخطاب السيد روجيرو.

ملاحظة للمحررين:

بول-هنري سباك (1899-1972) كان أول رجل دولة في بلجيكا في العقود التي تلت الحرب العالمية الثانية وداعيا رئيسيا للتعاون الأوروبي. وقد لعب دورا كبيرا في تشكيل الجماعة الاقتصادية الأوروبية ومنظمة حلف شمال الأطلسي.

التحدي العالمي: الفرص و.

الخيارات في نظام التداول المتعدد الأطراف.

محاضرة باول هنري سباك الرابعة عشرة.

المدير العام لمنظمة التجارة العالمية.

جامعة هارفارد، 16 تشرين الأول / أكتوبر 1995.

ويسرني أن أكون هنا اليوم لتقديم محاضرة 14 بول هنري سباك، وتكريما لذكرى كبير الأوروبي ورجل الدولة البصيرة. كرس سباك حياته لقضية التعاون الدولي، وقدم أكبر إسهامه في الوقت الذي سعى فيه قادة العالم إلى إعادة تعريف النظام العالمي، في أعقاب الصراع المسلح الأكثر عمومية في تاريخ البشرية. ومن المتفق عليه تماما أن بول هنري سباك كان على حد سواء ملتزمة عموم أوروبا والأطلسي - هذه كانت قطع متشابكة من نفس بانوراما. وبالطريقة نفسها اليوم، في عالمنا المترابط بشكل غير عادي، لا أعتقد أننا يمكن أن نتحدث عن التعاون الدولي دون أن نأخذ نظرة عالمية. ولهذا السبب أود أن أركز على التعاون الدولي بأوسع معانيه، وأنا على يقين من أنك لن تفاجأ بأن ينصب تركيزي على الأهمية الأساسية للنظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف على النمو والاستقرار الدوليين. أريد أن أعطيكم الإحساس بنظام ما هو في تطور مستمر، تماما مثل الاقتصاد العالمي الذي تقوم عليه. اسمحوا لي أن أبدأ حيث بدأ سباك في النضال من أجل إعادة بناء عالم أفضل بعد عام 1945. وآمل أن أؤكد لكم ونحن نمضي قدما، أن التحديات والفرص التي نواجهها اليوم هي إلى حد ما مماثلة لتلك التي واجهت الآباء المؤسسين لنظامنا . رؤيتهم هي شيء نحن بحاجة ماسة لاستعادة. ومع استخلاص الدروس المستمدة من القومية المدمرة والسياسة الاقتصادية المتطلعة في الداخل، وضعت ترتيبات التجارة الدولية في فترة ما بعد الحرب لجلب جميع الدول إلى ترابط اقتصادي متبادل يساعد على صون السلم والأمن. وكان على التجارة أن تلعب دورا محوريا في تعزيز العلاقات بين الدول، في تأمين الوئام الدولي. ومن خلال بداياته المستوحاة من أمريكا إلى حد كبير والتوجه عبر المحيط الأطلسي، أسهم نظام غات التجاري إسهاما حيويا في تحقيق السلام والازدهار على مدى نصف القرن الماضي، في مرحلة عالمية آخذة في الاتساع.

وترتكز أسس النظام بقوة على مبدأ عدم التمييز، وشددت على وجود علاقة تعاقدية قائمة على القواعد فيما بين الأعضاء. وهذان العنصران هما مصدر نجاح مجموعة "غات". وهو نجاح ينعكس في زيادة التجارة الدولية بمقدار 13 ضعفا منذ عام 1950. وهناك المزيد والمزيد من الفرص الاقتصادية التي تعتمد على التبادل الدولي. ففي الولايات المتحدة، على سبيل المثال، بلغت الصادرات 5 في المائة فقط من الدخل القومي في عام 1960؛ وبحلول أوائل التسعينيات، كانت حصة الصادرات في الناتج المحلي الإجمالي أكثر من الضعف. ولسوء الحظ، فإننا نفتقر إلى إحصاءات جيدة عن تجارة الخدمات الدولية، ولكننا نعلم أن التجارة في الخدمات آخذة في التوسع بوتيرة أسرع من التجارة في السلع، وهي تمثل الآن نحو 20 في المائة من تدفقات التجارة الدولية.

ومع تزايد أهمية التجارة، تسهم مساهمتها في خلق الوظائف والحفاظ عليها. وفي الولايات المتحدة وحدها، هناك أكثر من 7 ملايين وظيفة تدعمها صادرات البضائع. ويعزى نحو ثلث جميع الوظائف التي تم إنشاؤها في الولايات المتحدة على مدى السنوات العشر الماضية أو نحو ذلك إلى زيادة الصادرات السلعية، وعمليا فإن جميع وظائف التصنيع الجديدة تنبع من نشاط التصدير. إذا كان لدينا أرقام للخدمات، فإن هذه الأرقام ستكون أكثر إثارة للإعجاب.

وعلاوة على ذلك، ازدادت تدفقات الاستثمار الدولي أيضا زيادة هائلة في السنوات القليلة الماضية. وبلغ متوسط ​​تدفقات الاستثمار الأجنبي المباشر إلى جميع البلدان 50 بليون دولار في السنة خلال النصف الأول من الثمانينات، وارتفعت إلى 194 بليون دولار بحلول عام 1993. وكان هناك وقت كانت فيه الأعمال التجارية الدولية تميل إلى أن ترى التجارة والاستثمار وسيلة بديلة لتأمين الوصول إلى الأسواق الخارجية. واليوم، تحتاج الشركات إلى أن تكون قادرة على الاستثمار والتجارة على نطاق عالمي - ولهذا فهي تعتمد على نظم تجارية واستثمارية مفتوحة يمكن التنبؤ بها.

وترأس مجموعة الغات ثماني جولات من المفاوضات التجارية المتعددة الأطراف. وقد أدى ذلك تدريجيا إلى تآكل التعريفات الجمركية، مما أدى إلى انخفاضها إلى ما لا يقل عن 4 في المائة في المتوسط ​​اليوم، وهو ما يعادل عشر ما كانت عليه في فترة ما بعد الحرب مباشرة. ومع تخفيض التعريفات الجمركية، أصبحت التدابير الأخرى المقيدة للتجارة أكثر وضوحا. وفي الجولات اللاحقة من مفاوضات مجموعة "غات"، تحول التركيز نحو الحواجز التجارية غير الجمركية، مما أدى إلى مجموعة متزايدة من التعقيد والشمولية من الحقوق والالتزامات. وفي الوقت نفسه، دخل المفاوضون في مجالات جديدة للسياسات، خارج المجالات المتصلة فقط بالتجارة في السلع، ومن ثم يسعون إلى كفالة أن يكون النظام مساويا لمهمة إدارة العلاقات الاقتصادية الدولية في عالم اليوم.

إن جولة أوروغواي التي أنجزت مؤخرا هي أوضح مثال على كيفية توسيع جدول أعمالنا لمواكبة العصر. وقد حولت جولة أوروغواي مجموعة "غات" إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية، مما وضع النظام التجاري على أسس مؤسسية مترابطة ومتينة. وتم إنشاء إجراء جديد ومتكامل لتسوية المنازعات لضمان الحكم السريع والموضوعي والمحايد عندما تنشأ نزاعات تجارية بين الحكومات. وأحرزت الجولة أيضا تقدما كبيرا في القطاعات التي كانت فيها السياسات الحمائية أكثر مرونة، ولا سيما في مجال الزراعة والمنسوجات، وأنشئت ضوابط أقوى بشأن الإعانات والتجارة الحكومية والمعايير التقنية وإجراءات الترخيص، على سبيل المثال لا الحصر. وكانت جولة أوروغواي أول من تناول التجارة في الخدمات وحماية حقوق الملكية الفكرية. ويمثل هذا الالتزام المستمر بتحرير التجارة وتعزيز المنافسة إسهاما رئيسيا من جانب الحكومات البعيدة النظر في النشاط الاقتصادي المعولم.

والعولمة، التي أعني بها تعدد العلاقات الاقتصادية المتشابكة بين الاقتصادات الوطنية، تشكل امتدادا طبيعيا للتقدم التكنولوجي في مجال الاتصالات والنقل. ومما يبعث على التشجيع أيضا البيئة المواتية التي توفرها القواعد والالتزامات المتعلقة بالنفاذ إلى الأسواق في النظام المتعدد الأطراف. وهكذا، دفعت السياسات الحكومية الداعمة والتكنولوجيا الحديثة الشركات ورجال الأعمال إلى العمل - كما يرغب معظمهم بشكل طبيعي - عبر الحدود بطريقة كان من الصعب جدا عشرين أو ثلاثين عاما مضت. والدليل على التكامل العالمي واضح في الطريقة التي تجاوز فيها نمو التجارة نمو الإنتاج عاما تلو الآخر - وكل زيادة بنسبة 10 في المائة في الإنتاج العالمي ارتبطت بزيادة قدرها 16 في المائة في التجارة العالمية. وهذا الاتجاه يتسارع؛ فإن الزيادة في التجارة العالمية في العام الماضي بلغت ما يقرب من ثلاثة أضعاف النمو في الإنتاج العالمي. وهذه النسبة المتزايدة من التجارة العالمية إلى الناتج العالمي لا تبين فقط الترابط المتزايد بين الأمم. وباسترعاء الانتباه إلى حقيقة أن التجارة الدولية أظهرت على الدوام دينامية أكبر من الإنتاج خلال فترة ما بعد الحرب، فإنها تسلط الضوء أيضا على الدور المركزي للتجارة الدولية في النمو الاقتصادي في فترة ما بعد الحرب.

هناك أولئك الذين يرغبون في وضع عقارب الساعة إلى الوراء، أن أتمنى التبعية المتبادلة للأمم. ولكن لا أحد يستطيع أن يوقف مسار التاريخ. وقد أسهم الترابط إسهاما كبيرا في زيادة الدخول والسلام بين الأمم، وهو هنا للبقاء والنمو. والتحدي الذي نواجهه هو كيفية جعله يعمل لصالح جميع الأمم والعمل بشكل أفضل.

هذا تحد هائل، صحيح. ولكن الأحداث الأخيرة أيضا وفرت لنا فرصة تاريخية، وهي فرصة لتحديد شيء مختلف ودائم في العلاقات الدولية. وأصبحت الافتراضات السياسية الطويلة الأمد التي يمكن التنبؤ بها في الحرب الباردة غير ذات صلة. وقد تغيرت العلاقات بين الشمال والجنوب، التي كان يسيطر عليها في الماضي في كثير من الأحيان الاستقطاب غير الضروري وحوار الصم، تغييرا لا رجعة فيه. في حين أن انهيار الشيوعية كان يرمز بشكل واضح إلى هبوط جدار برلين، لم توجه أي صورة من هذا القبيل الانتباه إلى التغيرات التي طرأت على العلاقات بين الدول المتقدمة والنامية. ومع ذلك فإن هذه التغييرات ستثبت بنفس القدر من الأهمية.

من وجهة نظر النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف، إذن، ماذا يعني كل هذا؟ إننا نواجه مهمة مزدوجة. ويجب أن نوسع نطاق المنظومة جغرافيا لجعلها عالمية حقا، وعلينا أيضا أن نضمن أن تظل فعالة في مواجهة التعقيد المتزايد في العلاقات الاقتصادية الدولية. وسوف تدركون جميعا المناقشة المستمرة داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن الخيارات بين التوسع الجغرافي للاتحاد وتعميق أحكامه الموضوعية. هذا نقاش مشحون سياسيا لأن التوسع والتعميق غالبا ما ينظر إليهما على أنهما بدائل متنافسة. ولكن بالنسبة للنظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف، فإن هذه ليست بدائل. ولأن منظمة التجارة العالمية تتطلع إلى أن تكون كيانا عالميا حقا ذا صلة بالتجارة، يجب أن نمضي قدما في آن معا على كلا الجبهات.

وفيما يتعلق بالتمديد الجغرافي، نواجه عددا من التحديات. أولا، سعت عشرات أو أكثر من الدول الناشئة عن انهيار الاتحاد السوفياتي، أو سرعان ما سوف تسعى، عضوية منظمة التجارة العالمية. إن عملية انضمام روسيا جارية، كما هي الحال في العديد من دول الاتحاد السوفيتي السابق، بما في ذلك دول البلطيق وأوكرانيا وأرمينيا. وما زال العمل جاريا على علاقة الصين مع الغات منذ عشر سنوات. جلب الصين وروسيا وغيرها من الاقتصادات التي تمر بمرحلة انتقالية إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية كمشاركين كاملين هو الهدف الرئيسي للأشهر والسنوات المقبلة.

وفي الأيام السابقة، سمح للاقتصادات المخططة مركزيا مثل بولندا ورومانيا والمجر بالانضمام إلى مجموعة "غات" في غياب أي جهد جدي للإصلاح الاقتصادي. وقد وضعت بروتوكولات انضمام خاصة. واعترفت هذه البروتوكولات بأن فرص السوق لن تنشئها قوى السوق، بل تستند إلى التزامات توسيع الواردات، مع السماح باستمرار الترتيبات التجارية التمييزية. ولكن المصلحة السياسية والأهمية الاقتصادية المحدودة لتلك الترتيبات ليس لها مكان في منظمة التجارة العالمية اليوم. وتشارك الاقتصادات التي تمر بمرحلة انتقالية في تحولات اقتصادية دراماتيكية وصعبة نحو نظام قائم على السوق. ويجب أن تساهم الشروط التي تنضم إليها منظمة التجارة العالمية في عملية الإصلاح، ويجب أن تكون واقعية. ولكن الحجم الهائل والقوة الاقتصادية التي تمثلها بعض هذه البلدان يجعل من المهم أيضا ضمان أن تكون شروط الانضمام داعمة تماما لسلامة النظام التجاري لمنظمة التجارة العالمية. ولا ينبغي التضحية بترابط النظام سعيا لتحقيق العالمية - حتى لو كانت العالمية هي الهدف النهائي؛ لأن نظام التجارة العالمي الذي يستبعد نسبة كبيرة من سكان العالم هو تناقض من حيث المصطلحات.

والثورة الجيوسياسية الأخرى في النظام التجاري هي القفزة في مشاركة البلدان النامية. وعلى مدى العقد الماضي أو نحو ذلك، تحولت عشرات البلدان النامية نحو سياسات تجارية ليبرالية واعتماد أكبر على المنافسة الدولية لتوليد الدخل والنمو. وقد اتخذ أكثر من 70 بلدا ناميا تدابير تحرير أحادية الجانب خلال السنوات العشر الأخيرة. وقد خففت هذه العملية من التقسيم القديم بين الشمال والجنوب. وقد وضعت بلدان كثيرة على مستويات مختلفة تماما من الدخل والتنمية إيمانها بالنظام التجاري لمنظمة التجارة العالمية للاستمرارية والاستقرار والوعد بالفرص التجارية. وهذا لا يعني أن مصالح وأولويات البلدان متطابقة. وفي حين أن جزءا من مهمة منظمة التجارة العالمية هو تحديد الطابع المشترك للاهتمامات حيثما أمكن، وتعزيز العمل المشترك، لا يمكن إجبار البلدان؛ لا بد من جلبها عبر الاعتراف بمصلحتهم الخاصة. وبالتالي، عندما تصبح منظمة التجارة العالمية مؤسسة أكثر شمولية وشمولية، يجب أن تستوعب مجموعة أوسع من المصالح. وقد يكون ذلك أصعب مما هو عليه في عالم أقدم وأكثر بساطة تهيمن عليه بضعة بلدان متشابهة التفكير؛ ولكن علينا أن ننجح، والنجاح سيكون على الأقل مجزية.

ومع ذلك، وكما قلت، فإن مختلف البلدان النامية الأعضاء في منظمة التجارة العالمية لها مصالح مختلفة. وفي حين تواصل بلدان كثيرة النمو والتحديث، وتولد ثروة كافية لجعل شعوبها تتحسن تدريجيا، فمن الواضح أن بعض البلدان النامية المنخفضة الدخل لا تشارك في ازدهار عالمي متزايد. ولا يمكن لأي مجتمع أن يشارك بفعالية في فرص السوق العالمية إذا كان العديد من مواطنيه يفتقرون إلى الضروريات الأساسية للحياة. إننا نتحمل مسؤولية مشتركة لتوفير الظروف اللازمة لكي تنأى هذه البلدان عن الأرض. وفيما يتعلق بالنظام التجاري، يجب أن نبذل قصارى جهدنا لنرى أن البلدان النامية المنخفضة الدخل قادرة على تنويع إنتاجها من الصادرات وتوسيع أسواقها التصديرية على أساس تنافسي. وفي منظمة التجارة العالمية، نضع برنامجا خاصا لأفريقيا، على وجه الخصوص، يهدف إلى مساعدة الحكومات على الاستفادة بشكل أفضل من فرص التجارة الدولية والاستثمار الأجنبي. وهذا جهد متواضع، ولا بد من بذل المزيد من الجهود، لا سيما بالتعاون مع المؤسسات الاقتصادية المتعددة الأطراف الأخرى.

الكثير للمهمة التي نواجهها في جعل النظام التجاري لمنظمة التجارة العالمية عالمي حقا بالمعنى الجغرافي. ماذا عن تعميق النظام؟ إن جولة أوروغواي، من خلال الضغط عليها بتحرير التجارة، من خلال توفير طريق للمضي قدما في مجالات التجارة حيث أثبتت الحمائية منذ فترة طويلة أنها مستعصية على الحل، وبتجسيد جوانب جديدة تماما ولكنها بالغة الأهمية من التجارة، أسهمت إسهاما واضحا في العلاقات التجارية الدولية. وكان إنجازا بارزا لإنشاء منظمة التجارة العالمية. ولكن بعد أي ولادة، يجب أن تتغذى النسل. أرى ثلاثة تحديات رئيسية تواجه مؤسستنا الجديدة في السنوات المقبلة. الأول هو توطيد ما قمنا به. والثاني هو إعطاء مضمون لجدول أعمالنا التفاوضي المدمج، الذي يشكل أساسا أعمالا غير مكتملة تنبثق عن الجولة. والثالث هو مواجهة التحديات الجديدة التي تجمع بالفعل في الأفق. اسمحوا لي أن أقول قليلا عن كل من هذه.

أولا، التوحيد، أو التنفيذ. والنطاق الهائل من المواضيع التي غطتها جولة أوروغواي أمر شاق بالنسبة لأشد الأعمال التجارية صعوبة. وتشمل نصوص النتائج ما لا يقل عن 19 اتفاقا، و 24 قرارا، وثمانية تفاهمات، وثلاثة إعلانات. ومن الواضح أن بعض هذه النصوص أكثر أهمية من غيرها، ولكنها تمثل معا نحو 500 صفحة من اللغات المصاغة بعناية، وهي مليئة بالالتزامات. (ربما لا ينبغي لي أن أشير إلى ال 24،000 صفحة الأخرى من التزامات محددة للوصول إلى الأسواق.) وبالنسبة لبعض البلدان، سيتزامن عدد من هذه الالتزامات مع السياسات القائمة. وفي حالات أخرى، تدعو إلى التغيير. ويلزم جميع أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية بذل جهود متضافرة لتوطيد نتائج جولة أوروغواي وضمان الامتثال التام لها. والسؤال المطروح هو ما إذا كان ينبغي الإسراع في وضع ترتيبات تدريجية لبعض هذه الالتزامات. ومن جهتي، لا أستطيع أن أرى لماذا ينبغي تأجيل فوائد التحرير في أي بلد يوما واحدا أكثر من اللازم على الإطلاق. وحتى تلك الالتزامات، فإنها تتطلب عملا مستمرا ومتواصلا في العواصم الوطنية وفي منظمة التجارة العالمية على أساس يومي. وهو نشاط نادرا ما يصادف العناوين الرئيسية، ولكنه ضروري للسير الصحيح للنظام.

ومع ذلك، فإن أكبر أولوياتنا، قصيرة الأجل، هي التأكد من أن النظام الجديد لتسوية المنازعات يعمل بطريقة موثوقة قانونيا وسياسيا. وعندما تنشأ صعوبات وخلافات، يمكن استحداث أحكام التشاور والتوفيق وتسوية المنازعات في منظمة التجارة العالمية. إن الاستعداد للالتزام بإجراءات تسوية المنازعات والنتائج التي توصلت إليها، لا يقل أهمية عن احترام القواعد. مع تسعة أشهر فقط من الخبرة تحت أحزمة لدينا، وأعتقد أننا يمكن تشجيعها بالفعل من خلال تشغيل النظام الجديد. أولا، تستفيد الحكومات منها بطريقة تثبت إيمانها الكبير بمنظمة التجارة العالمية. وقد حان حوالي 20 قضية إلى هيئة تسوية المنازعات - وهو عدد أكبر بكثير من أي سنة واحدة من وجود مجموعة الغات منذ 47 عاما. ثانيا، الإجراء التلقائي السريع جنبا إلى جنب مع العلم بأن في نهايته النظام هو واجب إنفاذ يبدو أن تركز العقول وتشجيع المستوطنات السريعة من خلال عملية التشاور الأولية - النزاع الأمريكي الياباني مؤخرا على السيارات وقطع الغيار هي واحدة من هذه الحالات. وهذا هو الهدف - حل النزاعات التجارية بسرعة، وليس، في المقام الأول، لتوليد الفقه. وبطبيعة الحال، فإن العديد من المنازعات سوف تدير دورها الكامل، ولا يساورني أدنى شك في أننا سنتمكن من إصدار أحكام موضوعية وواضحة وجيدة الجدال تقود ثقة الحكومات والمشرعين في كل مكان. ولا يحتاج أحد إلى الخوف من الاستنتاجات التعسفية أو عدم الحياد من جانب أفرقة المنازعات التابعة لمنظمة التجارة العالمية أو هيئة الاستئناف الجديدة.

وبالنسبة لجميع البلدان، تم وضع التزامات جديدة ومفصلة لإخطار السياسات والتدابير، حتى يتسنى للشركاء التجاريين أن يكونوا واثقين من أن لديهم معرفة كاملة بسياسات كل منهم. والشفافية عنصر أساسي لتعزيز الثقة المتبادلة وتشجيع احترام القواعد. والواقع أن أحد نتائج جولة أوروغواي كان إنشاء آلية لاستعراض السياسات التجارية، يجري فيها بحث السياسات التجارية لفرادى أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية على نحو متعدد الأطراف، بدورها، وبعمق. وتتيح هذه الفحوص فرصة للبلدان لإجراء تبادل صريح وغير خاضع للخلافات بشأن سياسات بعضها البعض. وهي تسهم إسهاما قيما في الشفافية، وتساعد على زيادة وعي الشركاء التجاريين بقضايا السياسة العامة.

وفي المفاوضات التجارية المتعددة الأطراف السابقة، اتجهت الأعمال غير المنجزة إلى عكس الفشل في الاتفاق على مسائل أساسية جدا، مثل ما إذا كان ينبغي القيام بأي شيء بشأن الزراعة أو المنسوجات، أو ما إذا كان ينبغي إعادة تصميم القواعد المتعلقة بالتدابير الوقائية. ولم يكن هذا هو الحال في جولة أوروغواي. ومع ذلك، كان من الواضح، بحلول نهاية المفاوضات في عام 1993، أن هناك حاجة إلى وقت إضافي في عدد قليل من القطاعات الرئيسية. وهذا الأمر أوضح في مجال الخدمات، حيث عقدنا بالفعل مفاوضات ما بعد جولة أوروغواي بشأن التجارة في الخدمات المالية وحركة الأشخاص الطبيعيين، وهي في خضم المفاوضات بشأن فتح خدمات الاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية الأساسية وخدمات النقل البحري. ونحن بالتأكيد لم نحقق كل ما كنا نحب في المفاوضات الخدمات المالية والأشخاص الطبيعيين، ولكن أحرزنا تقدما. وفي مجال الخدمات المالية، اضطلع نحو ثلاثين بلدا، على وجه الخصوص، بالتزامات قيمة إضافية في مجال فتح الأسواق.

ومن المقرر ان تكتمل المفاوضات حول الاتصالات الاساسية بحلول نهاية ابريل من العام القادم. وسوف تفتح فرصا جديدة للتجارة والاستثمار. وتتزامن المفاوضات مع اتجاهات الصناعة نحو التحرير، ويعزى ذلك أيضا إلى الضغط الناجم عن صناعات المستعملين والتطور التكنولوجي السريع. غير أن هناك مقاومة لاستئصال ترتيبات توريد الاحتكار في كثير من البلدان، كما أن العمل المتضافر المتعدد الأطراف يوفر أفضل أمل في تحقيق نتائج بعيدة المدى. إن النجاح في هذه المفاوضات يعني أن مشغلي الاتصالات ينبغي أن يكونوا قادرين على تقديم مجموعة واسعة من الخدمات بأسعار تنافسية، في كل من الأسواق الوطنية والدولية. والولايات المتحدة في طليعة هذه المفاوضات، مع واحدة من أكثر أسواق الاتصالات الليبرالية ومنخفضة التكلفة في العالم. وهذا هو السبب في أن التزامها بنتيجة حقيقية متعددة الأطراف له أهمية حيوية. نحن بحاجة إلى نتيجة قوية من مفاوضات منظمة التجارة العالمية إذا أردنا أن نجعل رؤية مجتمع المعلومات العالمي حقيقة واقعة - بكل ما تعنيه إعادة تنشيط الاقتصادات وتحويل مجتمعاتنا وتمكين الناس.

ومن ناحية أخرى، تتناول المفاوضات المتعلقة بخدمات النقل البحري واحدة من أقدم وسائل التبادل بين الشعوب، التي تحتفظ بأهميتها الأساسية لتدفق تجارة البضائع. والتحسينات المذهلة في تكنولوجيا الشحن خلال السنوات الأخيرة تحتاج إلى أن تقابلها تحسينات في بيئة السياسات التي تبحر فيها هذه السفن. وهذا أيضا هو التفاوض حيث توجد بعض المواقف الراسخة، ومن الضروري أن نستمر في التذكير بأن كل شيء صحيح ومهم مثل المفاوضات في مجالات أخرى.

وثمة جزء آخر من أعمال جولة أوروغواي غير المكتملة هو جدول الأعمال المضمن للعمل في المستقبل. ويتألف هذا من عدة عناصر. وقد أنشأ أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية بالفعل ولاية للدخول في جولة متعاقبة من المفاوضات في مجال التجارة في الخدمات، بغية تحقيق مستويات أعلى تدريجيا من التحرير. ويجب أن يبدأ أول هذا التفاوض في غضون خمس سنوات. وبالمثل، فإن الأعضاء في الزراعة ملتزمون بالمشاركة في مفاوضات تهدف إلى مزيد من التخفيضات في الدعم والحماية الزراعيين. والإطار الزمني المتوخى هو نفس الإطار الزمني للخدمات. وتعكس هذه الالتزامات وعددا من الالتزامات الأخرى الواردة في اتفاق منظمة التجارة العالمية بوضوح الاعتراف بضرورة تحرير التجارة بصورة تدريجية ومتواصلة - وهي حلقة حميدة من الجهود التعاونية العالمية التي هي أساس نظام متعدد الأطراف فعال.

ثم هناك ما يسمى & كوت؛ جدول أعمال جديد & كوت؛ - تلك المسائل التي، كما تستمر عملية التكامل الاقتصادي العالمي، تقترح نفسها بطبيعة الحال بوصفها مواضيع محتملة لبرنامج عمل منظمة التجارة العالمية في المستقبل.

واحد & كوت؛ جديد & كوت؛ المسألة التي هي بالفعل في برنامج عمل منظمة التجارة العالمية هي العلاقة بين التجارة والبيئة. ويكمن جوهر المسألة في كيفية ربط النظام التجاري المتعدد الأطراف القائم على القواعد، واستمرار تحرير التجارة، وزيادة تنمية الاقتصاد العالمي، إلى الشواغل والأهداف البيئية. ومن الممكن تصور الظروف التي يمكن فيها للتجارة، التي لا تدعمها سياسة بيئية سليمة، أن تنطوي على أضرار بالبيئة، أو على العكس من ذلك، يمكن أن تضر فيها الأنظمة البيئية بالتجارة المشروعة. بيد أنه في مثل هذه الظروف، لا بد من الحكم الدقيق في موازنة ما إذا كانت السياسة التجارية أو السياسة البيئية يجب تعديلها. كما أنه ليس من الصعب أن نرى كيف يمكن للاتفاقات البيئية الدولية التي لا ينظر فيها أن تحبط دون مبرر التجارة وتقلل الدخول - بل وتتعرض للإصلاح والتحسين البيئيين. وفي نفس الوقت، من الأهمية بمكان الاعتراف بالظروف التي يمكن فيها لتحرير التجارة أن يدعم بيئة محسنة عن طريق تشجيع الكفاءة وتخصيص الموارد الشحيحة على نحو أفضل. وإنني متفائل بأن عملنا الحالي بشأن هذا الموضوع في منظمة التجارة العالمية سيسهم في فهم أفضل للقضايا، ومساعدة الحكومات على وضع سياسات أكثر تماسكا في هذا المجال.

والتجارة والاستثمار هما المرشح الرئيسي في جدول الأعمال الجديد، لأن أحد عواقب العولمة هو التقليل من أوجه التمييز بين مختلف أشكال الوصول إلى الأسواق. وفي إطار مجموعة "غات"، كان علينا أن نفكر في الوصول إلى الأسواق ببساطة من حيث التعريفات الجمركية والتدابير غير الجمركية. وكان الحد من التعريفات وإزالة الحواجز التجارية الأخرى على الحدود وصفة التحرير. وقال إن الاستثمار الأجنبي مسألة مختلفة تماما. والواقع أن البلدان كثيرا ما اعتبرت التعريفات والحواجز التجارية الأخرى آليات ملائمة لحفز الاستثمار الأجنبي. وقد وفرت حماية السوق المحلية أرباحا جذابة للمستثمرين الأجانب. وكان هذا هو جوهر استراتيجية تنمية إحلال الواردات - وهي استراتيجية فشلت إلى حد بعيد، وقد عانت من مصداقيتها الآن. في عالم اليوم من الأعمال التجارية الدولية، ينظر إلى التجارة والاستثمار على نحو متزايد كمكملات، وليس بدائل. ويمكن أن توجد أجزاء مختلفة من الشركات التجارية الدولية في عدة بلدان مختلفة. وعلى نحو متزايد، تتاجر الشركات التجارية للاستثمار وتستثمر في التجارة. ولا يمكن لمنظمة التجارة العالمية أن تهتم فقط بالجانب التجاري من المعادلة - أي إنكار واقع الممارسات التجارية العالمية الحديثة.

وليس من قبيل المصادفة أن تدفقات الاستثمار الأجنبي المباشر في جميع أنحاء العالم تضاعف أربع مرات، أي ما يقرب من 200 بليون دولار سنويا، في السنوات العشر حتى عام 1993. والواقع أن أهمية الاستثمار اعترف بها في الاتفاق العام بشأن التجارة في الخدمات الذي تم التفاوض عليه في جولة أوروغواي، أو الاستثمار، أو الوجود التجاري، هو أحد أنماط تقديم الخدمات الأربعة التي تعهد أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية بموجبها بالتزامات الوصول إلى الأسواق. ولكنني أعتقد أننا بحاجة إلى نهج أوسع نطاقا أو أفقيا لقواعد الاستثمار الدولية. وستستند هذه القواعد إلى مبادئ منظمة التجارة العالمية المتمثلة في عدم التمييز والمعاملة الوطنية، وتهيئ بيئة سياسة لتشجيع الاستثمار الأجنبي وصونه، سواء في السلع أو الخدمات. وقد بدأت منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي بالفعل العمل في هذا الاتجاه، ولكنني أعتقد أن الحكومات ستعترف بشكل متزايد بالحاجة إلى العمل على الاستثمار في وضع أكثر عالمية أيضا. ولا سيما أن البلدان النامية لا تستهدف فقط نسبة متزايدة من الاستثمارات الدولية ولكنها تصبح نفسها مستثمرا هاما في الخارج. وأود أن أشير إلى أن اتفاق جولة أوروغواي بشأن تدابير الاستثمار المتصلة بالتجارة يستدعي بحث الأعضاء في غضون خمس سنوات من القضية لوضع أحكام بشأن سياسة الاستثمار.

وتشير نفس الولاية إلى سياسة المنافسة، التي سيتعين علينا أيضا أن ندرسها كمرشح محتمل للقيام بمزيد من العمل. وبطبيعة الحال، ما قمنا به في الغات ومنظمة التجارة العالمية على مدى 50 عاما في تعزيز بيئة تجارية ليبرالية هو على وجه التحديد تعزيز المنافسة. ولكن إذا نجحنا في جعل قواعد المنافسة بين البلدان تعمل بفعالية، فإن هذا النجاح ذاته يتطلب منا أن نذهب أبعد من ذلك وننظر في الطريقة التي يمكن أن يؤدي بها سلوك الشركات إلى تشويه المنافسة الدولية. وسوف نحتاج إلى معرفة ما إذا كانت هناك أية مجالات تكون فيها قواعد المنافسة الصريحة أو تفاهمات محددة ضرورية على الصعيد الدولي لاستكمال القوانين التي تملكها حكومات كثيرة بالفعل في كتبها. ولا يساورني أدنى شك في أن قواعد المنافسة ضرورية لسير عمل الأسواق على نحو سليم - ولكن ما نحتاج إلى توضيحه هو أفضل السبل لتعزيز هذه التخصصات على الصعيدين الوطني والدولي.

ويود بعض أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية أن يروا أن الخطة الجديدة تشمل موضوع التجارة والمعايير الاجتماعية. وهذه مسألة مثيرة للجدل إلى حد كبير، وفي غياب توافق في الآراء، لا توجد إمكانية لإدراجها في جدول أعمال منظمة التجارة العالمية.

ومن الواضح أن ما نحتاج إليه أولا وقبل كل شيء هو بذل جهد شامل لإضفاء بعض الوضوح على العديد من المسائل المعقدة التي تنطوي عليها هنا.

المسألة الأولى التي يجب توضيحها هي طبيعة الموضوع؛ ھل نتحدث عن المیزة النسبیة للبلدان النامیة التي تأتي من انخفاض مستویات الأجور - حیث یتم تقدیم القضیة في بعض الأحیان - أو ھل نتحدث عن معاییر حقوق الإنسان أو العمل؟ ومن الأهمية بمكان توضيح شروط المناقشة من حيث صلتها بالتجارة.

والنقطة الثانية هي تحديد المسائل الرئيسية المتصلة بالتجارة؛ على سبيل المثال، هل نتحدث عن عمل الأطفال أو الحقوق النقابية من حيث معايير العمل أو من حيث حقوق الإنسان؟

وهذه ليست سوى بعض الشروط المسبقة لفتح مناقشة بشأن ما إذا كان من الممكن إجراء مناقشة مفيدة في الواقع بشأن هذه المسائل.

لحسن الحظ، نحن لا نبدأ من الصفر. وبدأت المناقشة حول هذه المسألة في مؤتمر السلام في فرساي، وقد انعكست بعض المبادئ المعنية في المادة العشرون من مجموعة "غات" منذ بدايتها. وفي الأمم المتحدة وفي منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي وفي منظمة العمل الدولية والإدارات الوطنية، أحرزت المناقشة تقدما قيما بل وأنتجت بعض التدابير العملية. وأود أن أشير بصفة خاصة إلى أحدث أعمال منظمة العمل الدولية، من أجل تحديد بعض المبادئ التي يمكن أن تكون هامة لأي مناقشة في منظمة التجارة العالمية. تم عرض هذه المبادئ على أنها & كوت؛ القيم المشتركة & كوت؛ دون أي معارضة من عضوية منظمة العمل الدولية.

ويتمثل أحد هذه المبادئ في أن النمو الاقتصادي والاجتماعي والتنمية مترابطان إلى حد كبير. وعندما يكون الوضع الاقتصادي فقيرا، من المرجح أن يكون الوضع الاجتماعي فقيرا أيضا. وبالمقابل، عندما يكون هناك نمو اقتصادي، من المرجح أن تأتي التنمية الاجتماعية أيضا.

While no-one should challenge the legitimate right of developing countries to use the comparative advantage of lower costs, and no-one should use human rights and issues of social standards as an excuse for disguised protectionism, no country should deliberately deny workers' rights or attempt to generate artificially-lower costs by forced labour, discrimination against women, exploitation of children or other such abuses.

We should on no account allow this debate to re-open a North-South divide. Dialogue is the best approach to finding ways to improve the observance of labour standards.

Finally, the ILO has recognised the necessity of improving its means of acting on these issues.

I wanted to underline these points presented by the chairperson of the ILO's Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade earlier this year because I think that on the basis of these shared values there is the possibility of establishing the starting point for a discussion of the issue. I also believe that in order to convince developing countries that no protectionist considerations are involved in the debate, it is essential to prove that all possible measures other than trade sanctions are being taken to alleviate the problems. One excellent example is the Memorandum of Understanding on the elimination of child labour from the garments industry in Bangladesh that was signed in July of this year by the industry, the ILO and UNICEF, with support from the Bangladesh and US Governments. This joint approach combines restrictions on child labour with the improvement of educational opportunities for the children involved. This is a targeted and constructive approach to a specific problem, and as such I believe it offers a useful model for future efforts. On the other hand, to simply restrict imports of garments from the industries concerned would in all likelihood have just worsened the situation of these children.

Let me sum up my thinking on this issue by repeating the need that I see for a wide-ranging and comprehensive consideration of the issues; only in this way will it be possible to generate the necessary confidence to build consensus for a discussion on whether, and how, they relate to trade.

Last but not least, I should like to say a few words about two related subjects - reciprocity and the growth of regionalism in international trade relations.

There are from time to time calls for trade policies based on reciprocity instead of the basic MFN principle. These are based on the assumption that the degree of liberalization already reached by certain countries does not give them any real defence in a multilateral negotiation vis-а-vis those countries whose liberalization process is much less advanced. Advocates of reciprocity argue that such countries have no real incentive to deeper liberalization, given their benefits from the MFN system.

I would like to make a couple of points on this question. The first is that to present reciprocity as an alternative to MFN is a major departure from the trading system we have built up over 50 years, and it is just the opposite of what the founding fathers of the multilateral system envisaged.

Secondly, I can understand that a nation or regional group which believes itself to be an open market has the right to fight hard to obtain from all its partners the greatest possible degree of liberalization. If this argument is used tactically and temporarily as a negotiating device, there is less need for alarm over its implications for the system as a whole. But if it becomes a permanent instrument of policy, then the risk for the multilateral system could become serious.

Trade is technical in its substance but highly political in its consequences. Reciprocity as a structural alternative to the multilateral system equals bilateralism; bilateralism equals discrimination; and trade relations based on power rather than rules are the result. This would be a very dangerous departure from the success story of the multilateral system.

The growth of regionalism is a more complex issue. There is no natural contradiction between regionalism and the multilateral system. This has been the shared assessment of the great majority of the international trade community. The real contradiction, it must always be emphasised, is between open trade and protectionism. Regional trade initiatives can certainly help to lower trade barriers and thus promote economic growth. But the relationship between regionalism and a multilateral system based on the MFN principle is nonetheless a complex one. The provisions of the GATT have sought to ensure compatibility by requiring regional agreements to cover substantially all trade among the partners and to promote trade policies which do not lead to higher protection or extra restrictions on the trade of non-members. In practice, however, it has been almost impossible to assess the consistency of regional agreements with the multilateral system under these provisions. Since the creation of the GATT nearly 50 years ago, 108 regional agreements have been notified. Eighty existing agreements have so far been examined, and only six have been found consistent with the rules I mentioned above (the EU is not one of them). In recent times 20 new regional agreements have been notified, and are waiting to be examined in the WTO. It will come as no surprise that inconclusive results are likely here as well. Clearly there is a need to improve the rules and the procedures under which the WTO's members can assess this crucial relationship. But it is also clear that the legal issues are only part of the story.

The relation between regional and multilateral liberalization in practice has been a different and generally more positive story. For example, successive enlargements of the European Union have been followed by multilateral trade negotiations, which have maintained a de facto link between progress at the regional level and at the multilateral level. These links are the reason why most people have seen regional agreements as building blocks for multilateral free trade.

Is the situation changing, and do we need to adjust this generally positive perception? Let me suggest some considerations.

Until quite recently, there was only one large regional grouping, and that was limited to a number of western European countries. The US was historically opposed to regionalism. But this situation has changed. Since the 1980s, the US has begun to build its own regional agreements, through free trade with Canada, through NAFTA, and through APEC, etc. Now, almost all the member countries of the WTO also belong to a regional trade agreement. The importance of regional agreements as a means of tariff reduction has declined (this is also thanks to the success of the GATT). Regional agreements are becoming more and more important in terms of trade rules, and for the political weight they represent in international negotiations. These are elements which could break up the parallelism between regional and multilateral progress; there is the risk that antagonism between regional groups could make progress in the multilateral system more difficult.

Furthermore, regional initiatives such as the suggestions for a trans-Atlantic free trade area could give the impression of re-erecting a discriminatory divide between the rich North and the poorer South.

The conclusion I draw is that we must be very attentive to strengthening the linkage which has existed up to now between regional and multilateral progress. What this means in practical terms is that regional liberalization initiatives must proceed almost in tandem with multilateral ones. What countries are willing to do regionally, they must then be willing to do multilaterally, so as to keep this parallelism between regional and multilateral commitments.

At the core of this relationship, there is the basic question of the kind of international system we want: a global system based on the principle of non-discrimination embodied in agreed and enforceable rules, or a world divided into regional blocs with all the consequences this would imply for political stability and security.

To sum up, it is clear that the challenges facing the multilateral trading system are about much more than trade matters as they used to be defined. I know that for some people - and for some countries too - the pace of change is unsettling and even alarming. Whether in the challenges that the information revolution presents to anyone over 30, or in the pace of economic globalization, there is an understandable reflex which asks the world to slow down a little. However, we know it will not.

If we decrease our imports from the developing countries, we decrease their growth and our growth alike. And the growth of many developing countries will be the most powerful engine for growth in developed countries.

At the same time, if we reduce export opportunities for developing countries we only increase unemployment and poverty in these countries, and further restrict opportunities for their young people.

And if we try to close our borders both to goods and to people we will just increase instability, violence, war and terrorism. So the only sustainable policy for us and for the developing countries is to continue a strong commitment to openness.

That is why we need to keep the multilateral system, with its reliable framework of principles and rules in good repair; it is a firm foothold in a shifting world. Liberalization within the multilateral system means that this unstoppable process can be implemented within internationally agreed rules and disciplines. This is the opposite of a chaotic and unchecked process - without the security of the multilateral system, change would indeed be a leap in the dark.

At the same time, the multilateral system is becoming more and more a political issue. This is happening because its evolution increasingly concerns national regulatory policies more than cross-border obstacles; and it is happening because the challenges to the system are increasingly political rather than technical. In this context, it could become very important to consider the possibility of strengthening the institutional basis of the system - for example by enhancing the political dimension of its central institution, the WTO.

It is my profound conviction that the confluence of political and economic events of the last few years places us on the threshold of an unusual historic opportunity: that of establishing a truly global system for the conduct of international economic relations, a system that responds readily to change and to changing needs, and one for which every nation will wish to claim ownership. Let us rise to this challenge, just as Spaak and the other builders of the postwar world did to theirs. Their achievements have shaped our present, and they should inspire our future.

ستريتس تايمز.

Countries need to foster greater, freer trade to continue to prosper: PM Lee.

DANANG (VIETNAM) - Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on Saturday (Nov 11) reiterated Singapore's support for the rules-based multilateral trading system.

While acknowledging that the mood towards globalisation is shifting - and there are concerns if the current system is fair and allows all to benefit as they ought to - he said he firmly believes that "we should foster more and freer trade to continue to prosper".

"In today's world, no single country can be self-sufficient. Everything from the supply chain to research and development, and economies of scale requires the support of a wider global market," he said.

Even then, he added, there is still some way from the ideal of fully open trade in the region.

Citing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which United States President Donald Trump criticised a day earlier for turning a blind eye to unfair trade practices, PM Lee said it was an important forum to build and improve the global framework for trade.

But it takes time to secure a deal among all 164 WTO members, "so we have to explore less comprehensive but more timely measures", he told the leaders of 20 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) economies at their annual meeting.

At an interview with Singapore media later to wrap up his trip, PM Lee said all countries were in agreement with wanting to promote trade with mutual benefits, but had different views on how this should be done.

A day before, Mr Trump, who abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal shortly after taking office last year, had declared the US would no longer enter into large agreements.

Speaking right after him, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged support for multilateral trade deals. They were both speaking at an Apec meeting for business leaders.

Asked about this, PM Lee said while the US wants to achieve closer economic integration and cooperation on a reciprocal basis and bilaterally, the other Apec members want to keep to a multilateral framework "which in the view of many of us has benefited all the countries including the US".

But he said they understood the political pressures and reasons behind the US administration's stance.

He added that they still hope they will be able to work together with the US, and among likeminded countries like the 11 that have remained in the TPP, in order to advance Apec's goal of free and open trade in the region.

"It doesn't mean that there's a consensus, it doesn't mean there's no conflict in perspectives, no tension. there is. But we hope we'll be able to work through them and maintain the cooperation which has delivered peace, stability and prosperity to many countries for a very long time," he said.

Earlier, at the leaders' meeting, PM Lee urged support for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving all 10 Asean members and six key partners, including China, Japan and India.

The RCEP, when concluded, can make a significant contribution to economic integration in the region, he said.

He added that the Apec grouping itself was one way of promoting free trade.

PM Lee said the remaining members of the TPP deal were also pushing ahead to bring the pact into force.

"We have reached agreement on the deal and I hope that the details can be worked out and everyone can sign onto it," he said.

A scheduled meeting on Friday between leaders of the 11 remaining TPP members, including PM Lee, had been postponed after a no-show by Canada.

But on Saturday, trade and foreign ministers 11 countries announced that they have agreed on the "core elements" for the deal.

PM Lee said developments such as China's Belt and Road Initiative, which includes many Apec and non-Apec member economies, will also promote greater connectivity, infrastructure investment and economic integration.

Noting that Apec has grown from an informal gathering of 12 economies in 1989 to having 21 members today, PM Lee said the grouping has come a long way.

Tariffs in Apec today are a third of what they were when it was founded, and Apec economies represent 60 per cent of global GDP and half of all global trade.

PM Lee commended Vietnam, this year's Apec chair, for setting up an Apec Vision Group to kick-start the review process of goals for free and open trade, and investment among Apec's developed and developing economies by 2020, first set in Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994.

He said: "As we approach 2020 for the Bogor goals, it is timely to reflect on the aspirations of APEC for the longer term."

BrandInsider.

المحتوى الإعلاني.

شانغري-la_2017may27_354x235_small. jpg.

lunch_300x200.jpg.

اشترك في ذي ستريتس تيمس.

إفون و إيبادس.

ستريتس تايمز.

سف الرقمية أخبار / حقوق الطبع والنشر © 2017 سنغافورة الصحافة القابضة المحدودة شركة ريجن. رقم 198402868E. كل الحقوق محفوظة.

لقد واجهنا بعض المشكلات في تسجيل دخول المشترك ونعتذر عن الإزعاج الذي تسببه. حتى نحل هذه المشاكل، لا يحتاج المشتركون إلى تسجيل الدخول للوصول إلى المقالات الرقمية ست. ولكن تسجيل الدخول لا يزال مطلوبا لملفات بدف لدينا.

Time to Restore a Balanced, Rules-Based Multilateral Trading System.

Introduction: An Epic Trade Policy Challenge for the United States.

The rules-based multilateral trade and financial system created at Bretton Woods in 1944 has been crumbling over the past decade. The WTO trading system to reduce trade barriers on a reciprocal, most-favored-nation basis has been replaced by a spreading network of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements. And far more threatening, the IMF financial system, centered on convertible, non-manipulated exchange rates, has been undermined by rampant exchange rate mercantilism, principally by China and other Asian nations.

The trade impact of this decisive change in the rules-based multilateral economic system has been predominantly on the manufacturing sector, which accounts for two-thirds of global merchandise exports and three-quarters of U. S. exports, shares that have been growing over the past couple of years from the sharp decline in oil and other commodity prices. Manufacturing industry is also technology-intensive, which has long attracted mercantilist trade policies in advanced and newly industrialized nations to stimulate manufacturing production through ever-larger trade surpluses. And while oil and other commodity trade is principally driven by global supply and demand, trade in manufactures is highly price-sensitive, whereby exchange rates and trade barriers greatly influence trade competitiveness.

The result has been a radical geographic restructuring and a sharp rise in imbalances for trade in manufactures, with severe adverse impact on U. S. trade competitiveness. The U. S. share of global exports of manufactures plunged from 18% in 2000 to 12% in 2018, while the Chinese share quadrupled from 6% to 24%, and the EU share (in trade with non-members) was only down from 22% to 19%. Even more detrimental for U. S. manufacturing, from 2009 to 2018 the U. S. trade deficit in manufactures more than doubled from $300 billion to $650 billion, resulting in the loss of 2.5 million American manufacturing jobs, or a quarter of the sectoral labor force, while in the other direction the Chinese and EU trade surpluses in manufactures also more than doubled to over $1 trillion and $500 billion, respectively.

In broader financial terms, global current account imbalances are consequently on the rise, centered on the $450 billion U. S. deficit and the $300 billion or more Chinese and EU surpluses. Thus the rapid decline in U. S. trade competitiveness for manufactures is reinforcing a transition of the dollarized financial system of the past 70 years into an undefined multi–key currency relationship. The United States has fallen to a distant third place behind China and the EU for manufactured exports, while the protracted and growing U. S. current account deficit has resulted in three-quarters of a $20 trillion U. S. official debt being held by foreigners. These trends set the stage for a substantial decline in the dollar and the end of the dollarized financial system, which would provoke policy conflict and trade disruption.

This study analyzes this dramatic loss of U. S. trade competitiveness in the dominant manufacturing sector and its consequences for the world economic order, and is in two parts. Part One presents the radical changes in the geographic structure of trade in manufactures from 2000 to 2017, as well as in closely related business services. The soaring U. S. trade deficit and Chinese surplus through 2018 receive special attention, including a detailed look at the 10 largest high-technology sectors of trade where China has a very large and growing lead, especially in the IT sectors.

Part Two addresses in historical context the fatal decline of the existing multilateral trade and financial systems and projects two alternative courses ahead. The first and current course would be essentially to abandon the rules-based multilateral system in favor of market-driven developments, with governments reacting through mercantilist exchange rates and protectionist trade policies, which together would be highly disruptive for trade.

The second, proposed course would be a U. S.-led “new order” of policy obligations to restore a balanced, rules-based multilateral system. This strategy would begin with a clear and forceful U. S. statement that the current course of huge, protracted trade deficits in the dominant, technology-intensive manufacturing sector is no longer acceptable, and U. S. policy is to move promptly toward balanced trade. Implementation would integrate trade and exchange rate policies, including dispute procedures with interim trade sanctions against mercantilist exchange rate policies by trading partners with large trade and current account surpluses. In parallel, the many bilateral and regional free trade agreements would be consolidated within a WTO open-ended plurilateral free trade agreement linked to convertible exchange rates free of manipulation.

A critical theme throughout the Part Two policy analysis is indispensable U. S. leadership if the second, restoration course is to move forward. Successful restoration would center on agreement among the “Big Three”—the United States, the EU, and China—which together account for more than half of global exports of manufactures. This should be a common interest because the current course could be trade-disruptive for all. The other two, however, have overriding internal economic objectives and lack forward-looking global political vision. Chinese trade strategy is oriented toward a massive, Asia-centric trade surplus for technology-intensive manufactures, while the EU priority is to resolve financial imbalances within the eurozone, which benefit from an ever-larger trade surplus with non-members. The United States, in fact, played the dominant leadership role for the Bretton Woods launch and 60 years of successful implementation. But U. S. trade policy leadership has lost public support in recent years and can be rebuilt only through a new order trade strategy that would ensure fair and balanced trade for the United States, along the lines proposed here.

Such U. S. leadership, however, will be an epic trade policy challenge. Vested interests in the status quo by influential multinational companies and banks will strongly resist. The WTO and IMF institutional structures are also deeply beholden to current norms and procedures that essentially ignore the increasing trade and financial imbalances, especially among the Big Three. And the most important challenge, in political as well as economic terms, will be to achieve a far more balanced U. S.–China bilateral trade relationship. The political sage Machiavelli, in a quote on my office wall, observed 500 years ago, “Nothing is more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order.”

These words ring true in today’s world of trade relationships. The stakes, however, are high and the potential for trade disruption from continuing the existing old order is great. Bold U. S. trade policy leadership for a new order of trade relationships should therefore be launched, which this study attempts to stimulate during this election year.

Part One: The Decline of U. S. Trade Competitiveness for Manufactures, 2000-2018.

Manufactures account for about two-thirds of global merchandise exports, and this share has been rising during the past couple of years from the sharp decline in oil and other commodity prices. Moreover, manufactures are at the center of the international trade and financial system, facing more extensive import and other trade barriers and far greater impact from mercantilist exchange rate policies. Trade in oil and other commodities, in contrast, is driven principally by global supply and demand.

Part One of this study thus addresses the dominant manufacturing sector of trade with a focus on the dramatic decline in U. S. trade competitiveness from 2000 to 2018. The U. S. share of global exports of manufactures plunged from 18% in 2000 to 12% in 2018, while the Chinese share quadrupled from 6% to 24%, and the EU share (in trade with non-members) was only down from 22% to 19%. Even more disturbing for the trading system has been the more than doubling of the U. S. deficit in manufactures from $300 billion in 2009 to $650 billion in 2018 and, in the other direction, the more than doubling of the Chinese and EU surpluses to more than $1 trillion and $500 billion, respectively. Moreover, 60% of the global U. S. deficit in 2018 was with China, with U. S. manufactured imports from China six times larger than U. S. exports to China.

This hugely unbalanced trade relationship among the “Big Three,” which also have the big three currencies, poses serious threats to both trade and financial relationships, as reflected in the equally disturbing contrast in the more broadly based current account balances: a rising U. S. current account deficit of $450 billion is principally the result of the growing $300 billion Chinese and EU surpluses. And as a result of prolonged, very large U. S. current account deficits, three-quarters of the 2017 U. S. $20 trillion official debt will be held by foreigners, interest on which will further increase the current account deficit as Treasury rates rise.

And yet American leaders have not given this trade policy challenge the top priority it deserves, including in official dialogue with China. Part Two of this study examines this policy failure and offers a forceful U. S. policy response to greatly reduce if not eliminate the U. S. trade deficit in manufactures. But first, Part One lays out the basic facts for trade in manufactures and integrated business services from 2000 to 2018, with the hope that this irrefutable, highly disturbing account will stimulate serious, forward-thinking action by the U. S. government.

The Declining U. S. Share of Global Exports of Manufactures, 2000-2017.

Table 1 presents exports of manufactures by the 14 largest exporters, from 2000 to 2017, which together accounted for $8,168 billion, or 88%, of global exports in 2017. Three overriding relationships tell the extraordinary story of the course of trade in manufactures over only 14 years.

Table 1 – Leading Exporters of Manufactures.

*EU exports to non-members, as also calculated for world, which is used throughout this study.

Source(s): WTO, International Trade Statistics.

First, all 14 exporters are from the three dominant exporting regions: 8 in Asia, 3 in Western Europe, and 3 in North America. Turkey has had a customs union with the EU since 1995 and is therefore in the Western Europe region for trade in manufactures, as reflected in its 450% increase in manufactured exports. Moreover, if other, smaller Asian exporters are included, the 88% would rise above 90%, leaving less than 10% of global exports of manufactures by the rest of the world—South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, including Russia. This three-region concentration in export-orientated industrialization is, if anything, intensifying from export-driven trade strategies, making the other regions of the world even more dependent on exports of fuels, industrial raw materials, and agricultural commodities, which are vulnerable to disruptive swings in price and quantity. This important subject is worthy of in depth investigation, although it is largely beyond the scope of this study.

Second, among the three dominant exporting regions, the Asian share has risen sharply from 2000 to 2017, principally offset by a major decline in the North American share. As shown in the bottom three lines of the table, exports of the eight Asians grew by 249%, to $4,363 billion in 2017, while Western European export growth was 155%, to $2,120 billion, and North American growth lagged far behind at 75%, to $1,685 billion. As a result, the Asian share of exports by the 14 rose from 35% in 2000 to 53% in 2017, while the North American share dropped from 27% to 21%, and the Western European share was only down from 24% to 23%. The Asian century is thus already in full bloom for exports of manufactures.

The third and most politically charged changed relationship is by and among the “Big Three” exporters—China, the EU, and the United States—whose aggregate share of world manufactured exports rose from 45% in 2000 to 55% in 2017. Most important is the dramatic changing of places among the three, with Chinese export growth of 901%, EU growth of 143%, and U. S. export growth of only 79%, or about half the EU growth and less than a tenth of Chinese growth. As a result, the Chinese share of global exports quadrupled, from 6% in 2000 to 24% in 2017, the EU share declined from 22% to 19%, and the U. S. share plunged from 18% to 13% in 2017 and, as explained below, to 12% in 2018. In absolute terms, U. S. exports of $650 billion in 2000 were almost three times larger than Chinese exports of $220 billion, while by 2017, Chinese exports of $2,202 billion were almost double U. S. exports of $1,164 billion.

These export figures for the dominant manufacturing sector of trade raise a number of policy issues, principally related to trade among the advanced and newly industrialized exporters in the three regions. Even more disturbing and threatening for policy conflict, however, has been the rapid rise since 2009 in trade imbalances among the three regions, and most sharply among the Big Three.

The Soaring U. S. Trade Deficit in Manufactures, 2009-2017.

The most definitive measure of the decline in U. S. trade competitiveness for manufactures is the soaring trade deficit since 2009. The trade balance is the bottom line for the impact on American production and jobs. Manufactured exports can have imported components and imports can have previously exported components, but this nets out in the bottom-line trade balance. As for the impact on U. S. jobs, estimates range from 4,000 to 10,000 American manufacturing jobs lost for each $1 billion increase in the trade deficit, depending largely on the mix of industries being examined. The midpoint of 7,000 jobs is used throughout this study as a reasonable approximation of the job loss from the growing trade deficit.

Table 2 presents the trade balances for manufactures in 2009 and 2017 for the same 14 largest exporters listed in Table 1. The central, overriding development is the huge increases in the trade imbalances in only five years, both among the three exporting regions and even more sharply among the Big Three. The surplus by the eight Asians rose by $697 billion, or 74%, the surplus by the three Europeans rose by $273 billion, or 101%, and in the other direction, the deficit by the three North Americans increased by $306 billion, or 73%. Six of the eight Asians and all three Europeans had growing surpluses, while for the North Americans, the United States and Canada had much larger deficits while the Mexican deficit of $16 billion declined to $8 billion. As for the Big Three, their rapidly growing trade imbalances overwhelm the other 11 imbalances. The Chinese surplus rose by $574 billion, or 128%, the EU surplus rose by $247 billion, or 108%, and the U. S. deficit was up by $267 billion, or 83%. Together, these soaring trade imbalances by the Big Three, as a share of the imbalances for all of the 14, rose from 61% in 2009 to 72% in 2017, with the next largest deficit increase of $47 billion by Canada and the next largest surplus increase of $82 billion by South Korea. This increasingly dominant rise in the Big Three trade imbalances for the price-sensitive and technology-intensive manufacturing sector will thus be a central policy issue in Part Two, not only for trade policy, but also for the financial relationship among their three key currencies.

Table 2 – Trade Balances in Manufactures.

Source(s): WTO, International Trade Statistics.

Table 3 provides a detailed look at U. S. exports and trade balances for manufactures for principal regions and trading partners in 2009 and 2017. Five salient geographic dimensions of U. S. trade emerge that are fundamental to a U. S. strategy to restore U. S. export competitiveness for manufactures:

The three dominant exporting regions also dominate U. S. manufactured exports. U. S. manufactured exports to North America, Asia, and Western Europe were $957 billion in 2017, or 82% of global exports of $1,164 billion; Among the three regions, North America is well out in front as the number one region for U. S. exports. U. S. exports to North America in 2017 were $412 billion, compared with $306 billion to Asia and $239 billion to Western Europe. North America thus accounted for 35% of U. S. global exports of manufactures, well ahead of the 26% for Asia and the 21% for Western Europe, thanks largely to free trade and investment within NAFTA; The contrast in the U. S. trade balances among the three regions is far greater than for exports. The U. S. trade balance within North America in 2017 was a small surplus of $22 billion, with a moderate surplus with Canada offsetting a smaller deficit with Mexico. Trade with Asia, in stunning contrast, was in deficit by $577 billion, or 98% of the $588 billion global deficit, and the $149 billion deficit with Western Europe added substantially to the overall deficit with the three regions of $704 billion; As for bilateral balances, the three largest U. S. deficits in 2017 were with China, at $390 billion, the EU, at $137 billion, and Japan, at $86 billion. Manufactured imports from China of $470 billion were 5.9 times larger than the $80 billion of U. S. exports to China; The rest of the world, beyond the three dominant exporting regions, only accounted for 18% of U. S. manufactured exports in 2017, and the United States had a surplus of $116 billion. This reflects the large trade deficits in manufactures in these regions, although the surplus is relatively small compared with the huge deficits with Asia and Western Europe. Noteworthy is that U. S. manufactured exports to Brazil of $32 billion were only 3% of global exports and the $9 billion of exports to Russia were less than 1%.

Table 3 – U. S. Trade in Manufactures by Region and Principal Trading Partner ($billions)

Source(s): WTO, International Trade Statistics, and U. S. Census Bureau, FT-900.

An important dimension of the rising U. S. trade deficit in manufactures since 2009, presented in Table 4, is the deficit with the EU, up from $51 billion in 2009 to $137 billion in 2017. This increase is marked by a striking contrast between the more than tripling of the deficit for the four listed eurozone members, by $72 billion, from $32 billion in 2009 to $104 billion in 2017, dominated by the $46 billion increase in the deficit with Germany, and balanced trade with the non-eurozone United Kingdom, in surplus by $1 billion in 2017. The remainder of the EU also shows a substantial deficit increase of $18 billion since it principally involves trade with eurozone members. This contrast, highly unfavorable for U. S. trade, stems principally from an undervalued euro because of its uncertain future and very low euro interest rates.

Table 4 – U. S. Trade in Manufactures With Principal EU Members.

Source(s): WTO, International Trade Statistics, and U. S. Census Bureau, FT-900.

Growing Asian Export Competition for Business Services, 2009-2017.

Trade in manufactures and business services are deeply linked, often within manufacturing companies. U. S. exports of business services in 2017 of $171 billion were 15% as large as manufactured exports, and were in surplus by $43 billion, or 7% as large as the deficit for manufactures.1 This surplus has led some observers to conclude that a rising U. S. surplus for business services could progressively offset the growing deficit for manufactures. Chinese officials have likewise responded to U. S. complaints about the rising bilateral deficit for manufactures by saying that this is offset by a growing surplus for business services.

Such optimism, however, has never been justified by the facts.2 Since 2009, the United States has faced rapidly growing export competition from India and China, which make up, together with the EU and the United States, the “Big Four” exporters of business services. In 2017, they accounted for 63% of global exports of business services. Business services, like manufactures, are highly price - and therefore exchange rate–sensitive, indeed even more so. Export growth for manufactures requires a large upfront investment in a factory and the payment of transport costs to market. Business services companies, in contrast, need only rent office space and plug themselves in. Moreover, in recent years, for India and China, tens of thousands of business services professionals have graduated from U. S. universities and returned home, in many cases for lack of a permanent U. S. work visa, some with valuable Silicon Valley work experience.

Trade statistics for business services are far more limited compared with manufactures, but the WTO does provide statistics for principal trading nations for two broad categories of business services: telecommunications, computer, and information services and other business services, the latter including legal, management, R&D, engineering, and other technical services.

Exports and trade balances for the two categories together for the Big Four for 2009 and 2017 are presented in Table 5. U. S. exports grew by $54 billion, or 46%, over the five years, while Indian and Chinese exports grew much faster, by $39 billion (61%) for India and $44 billion (83%) for China. Thus by 2017, Indian and Chinese exports of business services of $200 billion were larger than the $171 billion of U. S. exports and growing much faster, while the EU remained by far the number one exporter, with $378 billion (as always, for exports to non-members). The increases in the trade surpluses are even more disturbing, with the United States in last place with only a $12 billion increase over the five years, compared with the EU surplus up by $65 billion, the Indian surplus up by $33 billion, and the Chinese surplus up by $26 billion, with the percentage growth in the surpluses even more striking: 39% for the United States, 87% for India, 97% for the EU, and 163% for China.

Table 5 – Exports and Trade Balances for Business Services.

Source(s): WTO, International Trade Statistics, 5.5 and 5.

Table 6 provides the same information for trade in 2017 for the telecommunications, computer, and information services sector, which can be referred to as the information technology or IT sector, as will be related to U. S. and Chinese trade in IT goods in Table 9 below. U. S. exports of these IT business services of $34 billion are less than a third of the $117 billion of EU exports, and only 61% of the $56 billion of Indian exports, while Chinese exports of $20 billion are not that far behind. And the U. S. surplus of a meager $2 billion trails far behind the $9 billion Chinese surplus, the $52 billion Indian surplus, and the $53 billion EU surplus.

Table 6 – Exports and Trade Balances for Telecommunications, Computer, and Information Services, 2017.

Source(s): WTO, World Trade Report.

This is the composite picture, as data permit, of the sharp decline in U. S. trade competitiveness for price-sensitive business services over the past five years, which reinforces rather than offsets the far larger U. S. competitive decline for manufactures.

U. S. and Chinese Trade Imbalances in Manufactures Surge in 2018.

The soaring U. S. trade deficit in manufactures from 2009 to 2017, and the accompanying rise in the current account deficit, entered a new and accelerated stage in 2018 with the global economic slowdown in GDP, which usually involves an even wider downward swing for the trade-intensive manufacturing sector. This disproportionately large adverse impact on trade is the result, in large part, of nations pursuing more mercantilist trade policies so as to alleviate decline in the domestic market through reduced imports and a larger trade surplus.

The multilateral trade figures for 2018 will not be posted by the WTO until October 2018, and the presentation here in Tables 7-9 is limited to U. S. and Chinese trade in manufactures, based on national trade figures.3 This is nevertheless a fitting conclusion for the Part One trade analysis since the United States and China are at the center of the highly unbalanced global trade accounts, with by far the largest trade deficit and surplus ever recorded. And the mercantilist dimension of the Chinese response to its lower GDP growth was especially large, with greatest adverse impact on the rising U. S. trade deficit.

Table 7 presents U. S. and Chinese global trade in manufactures for 2017 and 2018. In 2018, U. S. exports of manufactures were down 3%, imports rose by 3%, and the trade deficit soared by 16%, or $89 billion, to $650 billion.4 This equates to a trade-related loss of about 600,000 American manufacturing jobs, up from 400,000 jobs lost in 2017, and bringing the cumulative six-year loss to 2.5 million, about a quarter of the sectoral labor force.

Table 7 – U. S. and Chinese Global Trade in Manufactures, 2017-2018.

Source(s): U. S. Census FT-900, and Chinese Customs Statistics (Monthly Exports and Imports)

Chinese trade statistics recorded a $59 billion, or 3%, decline in exports, of which $9 billion was iron and steel, but imports declined more sharply, by 9%, and the trade surplus consequently rose by 5%, or $48 billion, to $1,046 billion for the year. The very large decline in imports reflects a growing mercantilist dimension of Chinese policy, for example through financial incentives and directives to multinational companies to produce more of their formerly imported components in China.

Moreover, the 2018 increase in the Chinese surplus was significantly larger than the recorded $48 billion as a result of over-invoicing of imports toward the end of the year into Hong Kong and free trade zones in Shanghai and elsewhere to circumvent restrictions on the outflow of capital. In December 2018, compared with 2017, Chinese trade data recorded a 64% increase in imports from Hong Kong, while Hong Kong imports were up by only 1%, with almost all Hong Kong imports in transit to China.5 Chinese imports from Hong Kong in December 2018, likewise, increased by 70% from December 2017. Thus the recorded decline of 9% in manufactured imports for 2018 was actually significantly larger, as was the 5% increase in the trade surplus to $1,046 billion. The difference could well be in the tens of billions of dollars, clearly bringing the 2018 surplus to $1.1 trillion.

As for the overall comparison between U. S. and Chinese trade competitiveness for the manufacturing sector of trade, there has never been anything close to the current hugely unbalanced trade accounts. Chinese global exports of manufactures in 2018 were almost double U. S. exports, while the Chinese surplus together with the U. S. deficit of $1.8 trillion approaches 20% of world exports. Such enormously unbalanced trade for the two largest trading nations is clearly in need of major reduction through trade adjustment measures as discussed in Part Two.

Table 8 presents U. S. trade in manufactures in 2018 for principal trading partners. The deficit is dominated by China, with $387 billion, or 60% of the global deficit, with U. S. manufactured imports from China of $469 billion 5.8 times larger than the $82 billion of U. S. exports to China. Regionally, the deficit of the seven listed Asians totaled $587 billion, or 90% of the global deficit. Also noteworthy, the three listed Asian members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement—Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam—recorded a deficit of $132 billion, with imports from Vietnam of $34 billion nine times larger than the $4 billion of U. S. exports to Vietnam.

Table 8 – U. S. Bilateral Trade in Manufactures, 2018.

Source(s): U. S. Census, FT-900.

The five principal EU trading partners listed show a sharp distinction between the four members of the eurozone—Germany, France, Italy, and Spain—with a U. S. deficit of $113 billion, of which $73 billion was with Germany, and the non-eurozone United Kingdom, with only a $2 billion deficit. This reflects the undervalued euro to the dollar over the past several years for price-sensitive manufactures.

The NAFTA trade relationship with Canada and Mexico deserves to be highlighted in view of strong criticism of Mexican trade during recent electoral debates. The $405 billion of U. S. exports to NAFTA were almost double the $213 billion exports to the seven listed Asians, and triple the $134 billion to the five EU members. And the trade deficit differential is even more striking. The $11 billion NAFTA deficit, consisting of a $48 billion surplus with Canada and a $59 billion deficit with Mexico, is trivial compared with the $587 billion deficit with the seven Asians and the $115 billion deficit with the five EU members. There was a negative shift in the 2018 NAFTA balance, with the Canadian surplus down by $15 billion and the Mexican deficit up by $13 billion, but this shift reflects, in large part, very large trade deficits in manufacturers across the Pacific, and consequent large current account deficits by all three North Americans, and so the U. S. response to the growing trade deficit with Mexico needs to begin by confronting mercantilist Asian currencies, which should benefit all NAFTA members.

Finally, Table 9 presents U. S. and Chinese global exports and trade balances for the 10 largest high-technology sectors of trade in 2018, which accounted for 52% of total Chinese manufactured exports and 65% of U. S. exports. The rapid rise of Chinese technology-intensive exports is by far the most important qualitative development in the U. S.–China trade competitiveness relationship, which is shockingly demonstrated by these figures. For the 10 sectors, Chinese exports in 2018 of $1,127 billion were 50% larger than the $752 billion of U. S. exports. Even more disturbing, Chinese trade was in surplus by $354 billion while U. S. trade was in deficit by $357 billion, and the Chinese surplus has soared by 128% since 2009, as has the U. S. deficit by 166%.

Table 9 – U. S. and Chinese Exports of High-Technology Industries, 2018 ($billions)

*SITC 54, 71-72, 74-79, 87.

Source(s): U. S. Census Bureau FT-900, and China’s Customs Statistics (Monthly Exports and Imports)

The full picture of the rapid rise of Chinese export competitiveness in high-technology industries is revealed by the performance of the 10 individual industries. The only two industries where the United States maintains a large export lead are road vehicles, centered on the deeply trade-integrated North American automotive industry within NAFTA, dating back to the U. S.–Canada free trade Auto Pact of 1965, and other transport equipment, thanks largely to Boeing. But for road vehicles, the United States had a very large global deficit of $152 billion in 2018 as a result of deficits with Asia and Europe. The United States also had a lead in exports of medicines and pharmaceutical products, although the trade is relatively smaller, and the U. S. $36 billion global deficit is far larger than the $7 billion Chinese deficit.

The Chinese lead centers on the information technology (IT) industries—office and data processing equipment, telecommunications and sound recording, and electrical machinery and appliances, listed 5 through 7. Chinese exports for the three industries in 2018 of $773 billion were 3.6 times larger than the $213 billion of U. S. exports and, even more striking, Chinese exports were in surplus by $302 billion, compared with a U. S. deficit of $227 billion. These figures, together with the rapid growth in Chinese IT business services presented in Table 6, indicate that China has the most to gain from the 2018 WTO Information Technology Agreement, even though China was the most reluctant to open its market on a reciprocal basis.

For the three machinery industries, listed 2 through 4, Chinese exports of $175 billion in 2018 were larger than the $165 billion of U. S. exports, and again the Chinese surplus of $73 billion contrasts with a U. S. deficit of $48 billion. And at least to end on a positive note, for professional and scientific instruments, U. S. exports of $60 billion were slightly larger than the $58 billion of Chinese exports, while the U. S. $8 billion surplus stands in favorable contrast with the $22 billion Chinese deficit.

The Troubled Trade Policy Course Ahead.

This concludes the detailed presentation of the dramatic decline in U. S. trade competitiveness for the technology-intensive manufacturing sector since 2000, capped by the soaring trade-related loss of American production and jobs since 2009, which accelerated in 2018. The manufacturing sector is not only the dominant sector of trade, but its technology-intensive content cannot be overemphasized for its impact on national economic performance. For the United States, manufacturing accounts for about 70% of R&D expenditures and 90% of new patents, which are the driving forces for productivity growth. Chinese manufacturing production, in particular, now double or more of U. S. production and increasingly concentrated in high-technology industries, is challenging U. S. technological leadership in key sectors through its export-oriented growth strategy and a $1+ trillion trade surplus in manufactures.

The consequences for this U. S. competitive decline for the troubled trade policy course ahead thus justify the study subtitle, With Technology-Intensive Manufactures at Center Stage . And these policy consequences, as addressed in Part Two of this study, fall into two categories of policy issues. The first category involves the direct impact on U. S. economic performance. How much will U. S. productivity growth and high-skill job creation be impaired by export-oriented growth in manufacturing by principal trading partners? For example, China is now achieving more rapid development and application of robotics for a wide range of industries.

The second category of issues relates to the fatal decline underway for the rules-based multilateral trade and dollarized financial systems, driven principally by the greatly reduced U. S. share of global exports together with the very large and growing current account deficit and consequent buildup of official U. S. foreign debt. This encompasses a more complicated set of policy issues, but based on the highly unbalanced shifts in trade and current account imbalances since 2009, a potentially disruptive end of the existing systems appears to be close upon us.

The short-term trade-related question is where the protracted U. S. decline in global competitiveness for manufactures is headed for 2018 and 2017. Perhaps the Chinese trade surplus will level off in 2018, but the greatly excessive trillion-dollar surplus will almost certainly continue, as will the more broadly based and growing Asian surplus, largely driven by Chinese export-oriented investment. There is also unlikely to be a major decline in the U. S. trade deficit, which currently transfers 40% of American consumption of manufactures to foreign production, principally in Asia.

The MAPI Foundation quarterly reports on U. S. and Chinese trade in manufactures for the first quarters of 2018 will shed light on these immediate trade developments, and should be of keen interest in this election year. But any short-term developments in trade should not detract from the critical need for fundamental reform to restore a balanced, rules-based multilateral trade and financial system, to which this presentation now turns.

Part Two: Restoring a Balanced, Rules-Based Multilateral Trading System.

Part One documented the dramatic decline of U. S. trade competitiveness for the dominant manufacturing sector since 2000, driven principally by mercantilist, export-oriented growth strategies by Asian trading partners, centered on China, which alone accounts for 60% of the U. S. global trade deficit, with U. S. manufactured imports from China six times larger than U. S. exports to China.

Part Two analyzes the consequences of this huge trade imbalance between the two largest exporters of technology-intensive manufactures for the deeply troubled international trading system. Two alternative courses ahead are presented. The first is to continue the current course of unsustainably large trade imbalances within what is a non-functioning multilateral trading system headed toward policy conflict, with likely severe disruption of trade.

The second course would be to restore a balanced, rules-based multilateral system in compliance with disciplined policy obligations within the WTO and IMF. A U. S. strategy to this end is proposed that would begin with a clear and forceful U. S. statement that the current course of huge and protracted deficits for the dominant, technology-intensive manufacturing sector is no longer acceptable, and U. S. policy will be to move promptly toward balanced trade. To this end, a central objective for achieving fair and balanced trade, dating back to the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, would be enforced obligations for convertible, market-based currencies free of manipulation. This integration of trade and exchange rate policies would then be used to consolidate the spreading network of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements within a WTO-based, open-ended plurilateral free trade agreement.

A recurring theme throughout Part Two is essential U. S. leadership, which will be more difficult because of the greatly reduced U. S. share of global exports, and the most difficult dimension of this leadership challenge will be the U. S.–China relationship. Full Chinese participation in the proposed reform strategy will not be necessary at the outset, and initial U. S.–China disagreement could lead to interim U. S. trade sanctions against China. Such sanctions could be avoided, however, through full and frank discussion of the political realities of the current hugely unbalanced trade relationship for technology-intensive industries, driven by comparably unbalanced trade and exchange rate policies.

The presentation begins with a brief historical account of the Bretton Woods multilateral agreement and almost 60 years of successful implementation, which is followed by analysis of its fatal decline since 2000, including the unfolding end of the dollarized financial system. The two alternative courses ahead are then presented, with greater detail for the second course to restore a balanced, rules-based multilateral system. The final section addresses the indispensable U. S. leadership role and the critical importance of achieving mutual U. S.–Chinese support for a fair and balanced multilateral trading system.

The 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement for a Multilateral Trade and Financial System.

Economic leaders from 44 nations gathered at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 to replace the widespread “currency manipulation,” as the phrase was coined, and highly protectionist bilateral trade agreements of the 1930s, with a new multilateral system of increasingly open and balanced trade with reasonably stable exchange rates. The meeting took place in the midst of the economic destruction of the Second World War, and the need for a bold postwar economic recovery program was paramount in the minds of the delegates. Leadership for the new economic system centered on the United States and the United Kingdom, with roots dating back to the 1941 Atlantic Charter, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed on postwar goals, including the right of all nations to equal access for trade and raw materials.

The principal Bretton Woods result was to launch a multilateral financial system within the newly created IMF, with obligations to minimize competitive devaluations to achieve an unfair competitive advantage in trade. The highly able and experienced U. S. delegate, Harry Dexter White, observed: “Given the choice, every country prefers to have its currency undervalued rather than overvalued.”6 A dollarized system was adopted, with other currencies pegged to the dollar, requiring IMF approval for changes of more than 10%, and with the dollar convertible to gold. The anticipated large trade deficits by the European and other economies in the immediate postwar years were to be financed by the IMF, the newly created International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank Group), and the U. S. Marshall Plan.

Another central IMF financial obligation was that currencies were to be convertible for trade and other current account transactions. As for trade policy, a multilateral trading system was agreed in principle at Bretton Woods, and realized in 1949 with the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to be engaged in progressive trade liberalization on a non-discriminatory, most-favored-nation basis.

Thus a highly creative and forward-looking agreement was reached at Bretton Woods, and it was successful beyond expectations for postwar economic recovery. Within 10 years, sustained, export-led growth was achieved by the major Western European economies, which led to the formation of the free trade European Economic Community in 1957, while there was a similar robust economic recovery for the war-torn Japanese economy. This extraordinary success, however, caused the initial dollar-pegged exchange rate system to be overtaken by events, with the result that the successful 60-year implementation of the Bretton Woods financial system became divided into two very distinct and fundamentally different stages, which have not been adequately understood in recent debate over the future course of financial relationships, and therefore benefit from a brief explanation.

Stage one of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, with currencies closely pegged to the dollar to prevent competitive devaluation, did provide a stable financial setting for European and Japanese postwar economic recovery. By the early 1950s their currencies were fully convertible for current accounts, as required by the IMF, and by the 1960s they were achieving growing trade surpluses, centered on the price-sensitive manufacturing sector, offset by a rapidly growing U. S. trade deficit. The appropriate trade-adjustment policy response at this point would have been for the Europeans and Japan to appreciate their currencies, but they resisted such export-inhibiting action and there was no IMF obligation requiring them to do so. Meanwhile, political pressure was building in the United States, as is happening today, to do something to reduce if not eliminate its very large and growing trade deficit.

This was the deeply troubled political setting for the transition to stage two of the Bretton Woods financial system through a forceful U. S. initiative in August 1971. President Nixon had assembled a pro-active economic team, headed by Secretary of the Treasury and former Texas Governor John Connally and his highly able young Under Secretary Paul Volcker, with White House support from Henry Kissinger and his NSC staff. The United States proposed to its European and Japanese allies that the dollar-pegged exchange rate system, with the dollar convertible to gold, be replaced by convertible, market-based exchange rates as the principal policy instrument for adjusting trade imbalances. IMF Article IV was elaborated to define prohibited currency manipulation as protracted, large-scale official purchases of foreign exchange to gain an unfair competitive advantage in trade. To jumpstart the transition, the United States imposed an interim 10% surcharge on imports, which shocked trading partners, and became known as the “Nixon shock.”7.

The Europeans and Japan reluctantly accepted the U. S. proposals and the second stage of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system was launched with dramatic financial and trade results. Over the next several years, market-based European exchange rates rose by more than 100% to the dollar and the Japanese yen rate rose even further, from 360 to the low 100s. As a result, the growing large U. S. trade deficit in manufactures reversed course and declined greatly. And so Bretton Woods stage two brought about far more balanced trade in price-sensitive manufactures among the industrialized nations, which lasted until the turn of the century.

One important dimension of this successful transition to market-based exchange rates, of current relevance, was that the dollar decline of more than 50% relative to the European and Japanese currencies increased prices of imports for American consumers and doubled European and Japanese per capita dollar incomes to be much closer to the U. S. level. This impact from a decline in the dollar, however, was fully anticipated by the U. S. government as a central consequence of the transition to market-based exchange rates and more balanced trade. Today, in contrast, there are mixed opinions in the United States about a large decline in the dollar, and little anticipated joy in China and other Asian nations from the large rise in their dollar-denominated per capita incomes that would result from the end of their undervalued exchange rates.

As for the GATT trading system, it moved ahead successfully and separately from the financial system over more than 50 years, thanks to forceful U. S. leadership.8 But it was greatly supported by the 1971 shift in exchange rate policies. The first six “rounds” of GATT trade negotiations, through the 1967 Kennedy Round agreement that cut relatively high tariffs by 50% across the board, had greatly reduced import barriers to trade on a most-favored-nation basis. Momentum for this trade liberalization, however, was driven by U. S. leadership, which faltered in the late 1960s from the growing U. S. trade deficit, but was restored from the positive trade results of the 1971 stage two financial agreement. And this, in turn, contributed greatly to the successful Tokyo and Uruguay Round agreements, including the creation of the more comprehensive WTO trading system.

The bottom-line assessment for the first 60 years of the Bretton Woods multilateral trade and financial systems is thus highly favorable in achieving mutually beneficial growth in international trade and investment on a reasonably fair and balanced basis.

The Fatal Decline of the Multilateral Economic System Since 2000.

This highly positive 60-year path of the Bretton Woods multilateral economic system, however, has reversed course toward fatal decline since the turn of the century, both for trade and finance, which have become increasingly interconnected.

The decline of the trading system has centered on the shift from multilateral trade liberalization on a most-favored-nation basis, within the WTO, to a spreading network of preferential bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), often in trade-distorting competition with one another. The WTO Doha Round, begun in 2001, languished at an impasse for its trade-liberalizing objectives, with a minor package of trade-facilitating measures of small trade consequence agreed in 2018, and then was essentially terminated in December 2018.

Part of the problem is institutional. A major result of the creation of the WTO was to bring developing countries more fully into the management structure, including one-nation-one-vote decisions on important issues, where a majority vote often consists of a large number of poorer countries with a small share of world trade, which are less engaged in or opposed to a trade-liberalizing economic strategy. For some decisions, a near-impossible consensus is required. In parallel, the trade-liberalizing leadership momentum of the industrialized grouping, which dominated negotiations of the GATT rounds, has decisively diminished.

Equally important for the decline of the multilateral, most-favored-nation trading system has been geopolitical shifts in trade strategies within the three principal industrialized regions through preferential trade agreements within the regions: NAFTA and other FTAs by the United States within the Western Hemisphere; EU FTAs to the east with the end of the Soviet economic bloc; and, more recently, various agreements in Asia, within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by China with South Korea and more broadly through a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), and getting underway by India as a rapidly growing regional trading power.

This regional fragmentation of the multilateral trading system into regional free trade blocs is not all bad, with broadly based trade-liberalizing results within the regions, which can lay the foundation for intraregional or multilateral free trade consolidation, as proposed below. The fatal danger for the multilateral trading system, however, is the deepening linkage between the trade and financial systems for price-sensitive trade in manufactures, with the strong preference of many nations to have undervalued currencies, as warned by Harry Dexter White 70 years ago.

These mercantilist exchange rate policies center on trade relations among the three industrialized regions and, most importantly, among the Big Three and their dominant global currencies. This is also where trade and financial policies become most deeply intertwined, with the greater policy challenge on the financial front, and which thus requires a more detailed explanation for understanding the policy course ahead. The two central forces driving the decline of the multilateral financial system are the disregard or rejection of IMF obligations for exchange rate policy and the end of the dollarized financial system that prevailed through the 1971 shift to market-based exchange rates, but is now approaching its terminal stage.

IMF obligations for exchange rate policy are contained in Articles VIII and IV. Article VIII, dating back to 1944, states that no member shall “impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current account transactions” nor engage in “any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices.” This obligation, as noted earlier, was implemented by the industrialized grouping by the early 1950s, but has still not been adopted by China and other newly industrialized economies as they have risen to prominence in international trade during the past decade. China, in particular, pegs its undervalued exchange rate to the dollar and tightly manages payments in its currency, principally limiting them to payments for its exports, and has discriminatory arrangements for these payments with some central banks, as explained below.

Article IV prohibits currency manipulation, more precisely defined in the 1970s as protracted, large-scale official purchases of foreign exchange to gain an unfair competitive advantage in trade. Such purchases have the direct and immediate effect of lowering the exchange rate below its market-based level, and again, while the industrialized grouping has basically fulfilled this obligation since the 1970s, newly industrialized economies, and China most importantly by far, have heavily engaged in such prohibited manipulation. China has made more than $3 trillion of official purchases over the past dozen years, which is protracted and large scale by any conceivable definition of the term.

Violations of both Articles VIII and IV have been obscured by a lack of transparency for official regulation of and intervention in currency markets, which has contributed to a nearly total absence of serious deliberations within the IMF of exchange rate policy obligations and their impact on trade. Recent IMF discussions have centered on External Sector Reports by the secretariat of the international accounts and policies of the larger economies. These reports encompass a wide range of “norms,” such as appropriate levels of exchange rates, temporary influences, and the performance of monetary, fiscal, healthcare, and other policies. This procedure has been appropriately summarized: “Too much judgment makes norm-setting a black box.”9 In any event, there has been no significant discussion of violations of exchange rate obligations. Moreover, the United States, by far the most adversely affected by such violations, has not raised the subject within the IMF, while the secretary of the Treasury, as required, has been reporting to the Senate Banking Committee every six months that no nation, including China, has been manipulating its currency in violation of IMF obligations.

As for the approaching demise of the dollarized financial system, in the fall 2017 edition of The International Economy , 24 financial experts were asked whether the dollar will remain the reserve currency.10 Most replied that the dollarized system will remain for a long time if not permanently, with responses such as, “The dollar will not be replaced,” “The U. S. dollar is far from being challenged,” and “I see no shift from the dollar.” Some others, however, saw a likely transition underway from the dollarized system: “A tectonic shift is beginning,” “The world is gradually evolving toward a multi-currency system,” and “We could eventually see a global system with three blocs.”

More recent developments clearly indicate that not only is such a multi–key currency relationship evolving, but also that it is closer upon us than most experts predicted only a year ago. There are great uncertainties, however, as to how this transition will unfold, largely related to the two alternative courses ahead presented in the following two sections, which will center on four interacting forces in play:

1. The financing of trade. This is the most clear and best-documented dimension of the decline of the dollarized financial system. Trade financing in the European region is shifting to the euro and other European currencies, while the share of Chinese trade financed in renminbi has soared from almost nothing in 2009 to about 25% in 2017. The renminbi has risen to become the fifth largest currency for international payments from 23rd in 2018. In December 2017, 45% of international payments were in dollars, 28% in euros, 8% in sterling, 3% in yen, and 2% in renminbi. Thus less than half of payments are now financed in dollars, and the dollar share will continue to decline.

China has actively promoted this shift to renminbi financing through the establishment of a network of clearing banks that makes its currency convertible for financing trade. Such financing had been carried out principally through Hong Kong, but in March 2017 the Bank of England and the People’s Bank of China signed such a clearing account agreement, and eight or more other accounts have been established in Europe and Asia, which are possibly in violation of the IMF prohibition on discriminatory currency arrangements. The 2018 China–South Korea FTA also encourages bilateral trade to be financed in their two currencies rather than dollars.

2. The rise of the euro and the renminbi as global currencies. The rise of EU and Chinese exports relative to U. S. exports, as presented in Part One, and the parallel surge of trade financing in their currencies should lead to a corresponding rise in holdings of euros and renminbi by creditors, both commercial and official through central bank reserve holdings. This has been slow in coming, however, especially for the renminbi, and for very different reasons for the two currencies. The dollar still accounts for a little more than 60% of reserve holdings compared with 25% for the euro and 1% or less for the renminbi.

The problem for the euro is not its availability as a convertible currency for reserve holdings but uncertainty about its future in the face of continued large trade and financial imbalances within the eurozone. Each time there is an internal financial crisis, as with the recent Greek crisis, there is a small shift in reserve holdings from euros to dollars, and then back into euros when the crisis subsides. Looking ahead, when the uncertainty about the future of the euro is resolved, one way or another, the EU share of global reserve holdings should rise significantly relative to the dollar, reflecting the substantially larger EU share of global trade.

The outlook for the renminbi as a global currency is far more important in view of its very large share of global trade and the current extremely small share of renminbi held by commercial and official creditors. The reason is simply that the currency is not convertible on current account as required by IMF Article VIII and has been manipulated frequently in violation of Article IV. Chinese policy is to have the renminbi become a major international currency, which would facilitate its trade and investment interests, and small, cautious steps have been taken in this direction, such as the agreements with central banks to finance Chinese exports. The “dim sum bond” market for convertible, renminbi-denominated debt outside China has risen from $1 billion in 2018 to $12 billion in 2018, and in November 2017 the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched, allowing offshore investors to buy $49 billion in mainland stock shares. But these are very small amounts of financial assets, compared with multi-trillion-dollar official reserve holdings in dollars and euros, and are not fully convertible assets in currency markets. A fully convertible renminbi on current account, in enormous contrast, should lead to a shift of trillions of dollars from dollars to renminbi for reserve holdings and for commercial creditors whose business is largely financed in renminbi, and this would result in a large appreciation of the renminbi to the dollar.

3. The huge and rising official U. S. foreign debt and its impact on the current account balance. There has been extensive political discussion in the United States about the federal debt doubling from $10 trillion in 2008 to a projected $20 trillion in 2017, but almost no attention has been given to the fact that about three-quarters of this debt is held by foreigners, which could cause a more imminent adverse impact on the economy related to trade. In mid-2018, of $18.2 trillion total federal debt, $7.5 trillion was in official foreign holdings, mostly by central banks, and $6.2 trillion was held by commercial banks and other foreign creditors.11.

Interest paid to foreigners on this official debt is recorded as a debit on the current account balance, but thanks to the extremely low Treasury rates of the past seven years, it has not been a major burden for the overall current account deficit. As Treasury rates finally rise, however, each 1% increase in payments on the $15 trillion foreign official debt amounts to a $150 billion increase in the current account deficit, and a 3% increase would double the current $450 billion deficit to $900 billion, or 5% of GDP. And this, in turn, would signal to markets a looming decline in the dollar, with a speculative shift out of the dollar to other currencies and further upward pressure on the Treasury rate. This shift would indeed have the characteristics of the “southern-tier syndrome” within the eurozone, as with the ongoing Greek crisis, except there are no IMF or European Central Bank creditors to bail out a $15 trillion U. S. official foreign debt.

4. The impact of government actions and reactions. How the three preceding forces in play will actually play out for the end of the dollarized financial system will depend largely on how governments react to the unfolding course of currency relationships and their impact on trade. A continued rise in the U. S. trade deficit in the politically sensitive and technology-intensive manufacturing sector could trigger a protectionist U. S. policy response leading to a broadly based trade war, disruptive swings in exchange rates, and highly adverse impact on trade. In contrast, a U. S.-led policy initiative to bring China and other chronic large trade and current account surplus nations into conformity with IMF exchange rate obligations, while consolidating preferential bilateral and regional trade agreements within a balanced, rules-based trading system, should produce far more positive results. These two alternatives are the substance of the next two sections.

The Current Course Toward Policy Conflict and Trade Disruption.

The current course of a soaring U. S. trade deficit in manufactures, 60% with China and close to 100% with Asia, is not politically or economically sustainable, and is headed toward a protectionist backlash by the United States. This would be a controversial policy response. Foreign policy experts will resist on the grounds that the United States has more important foreign policy fish to fry with China, and a growing number of “American” manufacturing companies are, in fact, “multinational” companies, with profits largely oriented toward production in and exports from China, and thus dependent on an undervalued Chinese currency. But the continuing large trade-related loss of American manufacturing production and jobs is fueling the protectionist momentum. Leading presidential candidates on both sides of the political aisle call for action to reduce the trade deficit, and 78 senators unsuccessfully pressed the president to include a credible commitment against currency manipulation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

In this uncertain political setting leaning more and more toward a protectionist reaction against China and other large deficit trading partners, markets will play an increasingly decisive role. The U. S. trade deficit for manufactures could continue to grow, as it did in 2018, while lower oil prices are leading to a decline in domestic oil production, which will increase imports. An even more important and troubling prospect for rapid growth in the U. S. current account deficit will be the rise in interest payments on the $15 trillion U. S. official foreign debt, described above.

No attempt is made here to specify how this U. S. protectionist reaction will unfold, except to make two points. First, this could happen fairly soon based on the unfolding course of events, likely over the coming one to five years, and should therefore be a high-priority policy challenge for whoever is elected president in 2018. And second, the trade policy conflict, although initially centered on the enormously lopsided trade relationship between the United States and China, will quickly broaden in geographic scope. Other Asian exporters, with exchange rates linked to the Chinese currency, will also be targets for whatever the initial U. S. protectionist actions. And other major trading partners, from the EU to Mexico, will be drawn into the trade-disrupting impact from a redirection to them of Chinese and other Asian exports to the United States, leading to mercantilist reactions on their part.

This is the current course toward trade policy conflict and trade disruption. The big question over coming months to ask the presidential candidates on both sides of the political aisle is what specifically they plan to do to reduce the huge and growing trade deficit for the technology-intensive U. S. manufacturing sector. One direction of response would be to take immediate protectionist actions against imports, perhaps together with export subsidies. The other category of response would be a broadly based initiative to restore a truly balanced, rules-based, multilateral trading system.

A Proposed Restoration of a Balanced, Rules-Based Multilateral Trading System.

Far preferable to the preceding trade-disruptive protectionist scenario would be an initiative to restore a balanced, rules-based multilateral trading system. This, however, would require strong and sustained U. S. leadership since there are powerful interests, including within the United States, for maintaining the status quo despite the threatening trade-related prospect ahead. Moreover, such U. S. leadership would need broadly based bipartisan congressional support, which would only be possible through a credible strategy to bring the extremely large U. S. trade deficit in the technology-intensive manufacturing sector back into reasonable balance.

The U. S. initiative should therefore begin with a clear and forceful statement that the current course of unsustainably large U. S. trade deficits, resulting in a continued buildup of excessive official foreign debt, is no longer acceptable. Either a balanced, rules-based trading system needs to be restored or the United States will be forced to act unilaterally to achieve reasonable balance in its trade accounts. The initiative would then lay out the basic elements of a proposed restoration strategy.

Such a strategy offered here begins by linking full compliance of IMF exchange rate obligations to market access for U. S. imports, and then bringing this integrated trade and financial relationship within a WTO open-ended, plurilateral free trade agreement. Four specific components of the strategy would be:

1. Full compliance with IMF Articles VIII and IV obligations for exchange rate policy. Violations of these obligations have been driving the soaring U. S. trade deficit in price-sensitive manufactures over the past dozen years. The relationship centers on China, which has been in gross violation of both Article VIII—through a tightly managed, undervalued peg to the dollar—and Article IV—currency manipulation through protracted large-scale official purchases of foreign exchange. Other Asian exporters have also largely ignored their exchange rate obligations in order to remain competitive with China, their principal trading partner, with substantial mercantilist adverse impact on U. S. trade. Continued access for exports to the U. S. market would therefore be contingent on full and transparent compliance with IMF exchange rate obligations. The United States achieved this in 1971 with industrialized trading partners, and now trade and financial policy negotiations would be engaged with newly industrialized trading partners, most importantly China, to the same end.

In the process of these negotiations, Article IV currency manipulation would be more precisely defined in view of recent gross manipulation. Specifically, newly as well as mature industrialized nations with sustained current account surpluses should rarely if ever engage in official foreign exchange purchases.

Hopefully such linkage could be obtained through serious discussion related to the unsustainably large U. S. trade and current account deficits. Otherwise, the United States would be prepared to call for a WTO dispute panel under GATT Article XV, which obliges members not to use exchange rate policy in a way that diminishes reciprocal access to markets for trade, explaining how violations of IMF exchange rate obligations constitute an unfair import barrier and export subsidy. And following the precedent of the 1971 U. S. initiative, an interim import surcharge of 20% or more would be imposed on the principal violators of exchange rate obligations, pending resolution of the WTO dispute procedure.12.

2. A WTO open-ended plurilateral free trade agreement. The trade / exchange rate policy linkage negotiations would move forward in parallel with a U. S.-led initiative to consolidate the spreading network of preferential bilateral and regional trade agreements within a WTO open-ended plurilateral free trade agreement, thus working to restore the multilateral, most-favored-nation trading system. The building blocks for this broadly inclusive plurilateral agreement would be bilateral and regional agreements already in place or under recent negotiation, including the TTP and the U. S.–EU FTA. This plurilateral FTA would almost certainly include the large majority of U. S. exports. NAFTA alone accounts for 35% of U. S. global exports of manufactures, and other Western Hemisphere FTA partners would bring this share close to 40%. Another 20% of U. S. exports goes to the EU, bringing 60% of U. S. exports to trading partners that would presumably support the free trade / exchange rate policy linkage.

The prospect for Asian trading partners is less clear. Japan and South Korea should be attracted to ensured free access to the North American and European markets, and they already have convertible exchange rates. Other East Asian large exporters of manufactures would have to make a difficult choice between free access to principal export markets together with strict exchange rate policy obligations and the threat of trade sanctions related to a GATT Article XV dispute procedure. Major prospective Asian participants would be India and Indonesia, with rapidly growing trade and a national interest in achieving a balance between trade with China and other industrialized regions.

In this context, a comment is in order about the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement between seven Asian and five Western Hemisphere nations. For the United States, there are a number of downsides in this complicated agreement, including the absence of exchange rate policy obligations as pressed by 78 senators, which will probably result in an increase in the U. S. trade deficit. On the plus side, however, free trade with Japan and several other Asians could be a useful building block for a broader, plurilateral FTA, as proposed here, while possible trade sanctions related to an Article XV dispute process for currency manipulation would apply to Asian TPP participants as well.

As for the rest of the world, Argentina and some other Western Hemisphere nations could well choose to join the plurilateral FTA, especially as they move toward more market-based, trade-competitive exchange rates. Other Western Europeans that already have FTAs with the EU would clearly want to join. The plurilateral FTA should also continue preferential market access for least-developed countries and accept greater exchange rate flexibility for countries whose exports are predominantly petroleum and other commodities.

As for the substantive scope of the plurilateral agreement, it would include across-the-board free trade in goods and services, non-discriminatory access for international investment as developed in regional FTAs, and other trade-related issues, such as protection of intellectual property and more open government procurement practices, as already adopted on a plurilateral basis within the WTO. It would not, however, be as far-reaching in policy scope as some bilateral and regional FTAs, while providing for more in-depth, limited participation agreements within the full plurilateral agreement. Management of the plurilateral FTA would be within the WTO framework, but with a separate managing body, weighted by trade composition, and specified dispute procedures, including for the exchange rate policy linkage.

3. The new, post-dollarized financial world. The previous two components of the restoration strategy would definitively mark the end of the dollarized financial system of the past seven decades, whereby the United States maintains a passive exchange rate policy while others often pursue mercantilist policies that drive up the U. S. trade deficit for price-sensitive manufactures, financed by large U. S. current account deficits and a rising official foreign debt.

The post-dollarized financial world would be a multi–key currency relationship centered on the IMF reserve currency grouping—the dollar, euro, yen, sterling, and renminbi as it moves toward convertibility—broadly complemented by other major trading nations also in compliance with IMF exchange rate obligations. It is uncertain, however, how this multi-currency relationship would play out during the initial years of transition. In 2018 and 2018, slower global economic growth has triggered large capital outflows from emerging market bloated investment sectors and mercantilist trade strategies to bolster domestic growth. Most importantly, China suffered a bursting stock market bubble that was grossly mismanaged through government intervention, leading to a massive capital outflow with downward pressure on the dollar-pegged Chinese currency. The tightly managed non-convertible currency, however, continues to be greatly undervalued as evident by the continued rise in the trade surplus for price-sensitive manufactures. Thus Chinese exchange rate mercantilism is temporarily centered on the non-convertible dollar peg, but this will shift back to include targeted government purchases once the capital outflow has run its course.

More broadly, current financial turmoil should greatly diminish to the extent that Asian exporters adopt IMF obligations for convertible currencies without mercantilist manipulation. The assessment offered here is that as all major currencies become convertible and free of manipulation, financial relationships should tend to stabilize in a relatively short period of time, with more balanced trade relationships as a result of three principal changes from existing, highly unbalanced trade and financial relationships. The first would be far more market-oriented exchange rates as the principal trade adjustment mechanism, with far less official intervention in currency markets. As the lead model, the United States has exercised almost no official market intervention since 1971 when it ended its gold conversion commitment, and other official reserve currencies should likewise move toward far smaller intervention, in compliance with their IMF obligations. From this, there would also be less need for reserve holdings, and a coordinated process should be adopted for the orderly drawdown of the current very high levels of reserves, which are largely the result of currency manipulation. Such a coordinated drawdown of excessive reserves was in fact discussed post-1971, but was overtaken by more heavily managed exchange rates.

The second change would be in the dollar relative to the currencies of major trade surplus trading partners. The direction of change—a decline in the dollar—is clear as others cease currency manipulation and reduce their current account surpluses, but the degree of decline is highly uncertain. If the United States increases export competitiveness for manufactures through policy reforms and higher national productivity growth compared with Asian and European competitors, the dollar decline would be smaller, although a major shift from current lagging U. S. productivity growth is doubtful anytime soon. Higher energy prices and resumed growth in U. S. shale oil and natural gas production would also be positive for the dollar rate. In the other direction, however, a decline in foreign dollar holdings as overall reserve levels are reduced and both official and commercial creditors shift out of dollars into more balanced holdings of other currencies, including a progressively more convertible renminbi, would act to lower the dollar rate. And as noted earlier, each 1% increase in interest paid on the $15 trillion U. S. official foreign debt would add $150 billion to the U. S. current account deficit, which would work to stimulate a market-based shift out of the dollar and a consequent decline in the dollar exchange rate. The judgment here, highly speculative, is that the decline in the dollar would be large, possibly 30-50%, relative to large trade surplus Asian trading partners, which would bring a large and welcome decline in the U. S. trade deficit in manufactures. Indeed, this is what happened in the 1970s when Western European and Japanese trading partners stopped their currency manipulation and their exchange rates to the dollar soared by 100% or more.

The third and least clear change in financial relationships would be the convertibility course for the Chinese currency, which can be referred to as the trillion-dollar Chinese trade surplus dilemma. Over time, this dilemma will play a central role in the proposed strategy to restore a balanced, rules-based multilateral trading system, and is thus worthy of a separate, key component presentation here.

4. The trillion-dollar Chinese trade surplus dilemma. China has more than $3 trillion of currency reserves plus a large buildup of “sovereign wealth funds” that amount to official foreign investment of excess reserve holdings. This huge official international financial surplus continues to rise through a $300 billion current account surplus driven by a $1+ trillion trade surplus in manufactures, which accounts for 60% of the U. S. $650 billion trade deficit.

This is the trillion-dollar Chinese trade surplus dilemma for trade between the two largest industrial powers and exporters of manufactures, and a substantial decline of the enormous trade imbalances of both nations goes to the heart of the restoration strategy proposed here. It is not, however, an unrealistic challenge to confront if seriously addressed by the two governments, in view of two unfolding developments within the Chinese economy.

The first unfolding development in China is a restructuring of the economy away from export-oriented manufacturing to domestically oriented consumption of services. This restructuring, however, is moving very slowly. In 2018, Chinese GDP grew by 6.9%, while growth in manufactures was not far behind at about 5%. The Chinese problem for manufactures is extensive overcapacity and a lackluster domestic market, which has caused China to turn even more mercantilist in its trade strategy. In 2018, the trade surplus in manufactures, which equates to about a third of Chinese manufacturing production, grew by more than 5% when taking account of the over-invoicing of imports.

The second unfolding development is the Chinese objective for the renminbi to become a major global currency within the IMF, which China judges to be in its economic self-interest. China was designated an official reserve currency in November 2018, to join the dollar, euro, yen, and sterling, but this role should include full implementation of IMF exchange rate policy obligations for currency convertibility without manipulation, which has not yet been implemented significantly, as explained earlier.

The big question for the Chinese trillion-dollar trade surplus dilemma therefore is how soon and to what extent will these two developments move forward? And it is in these highly uncertain circumstances that the United States would launch high-level bilateral negotiations with China about inclusion in the U. S. plurilateral FTA initiative. In addition to exchange rate obligations, Chinese inclusion would involve reciprocal market access for trade and investment. In effect, China would have to fully accept developed country status within the trading system as a member of the plurilateral FTA.

It is possible, and indeed likely, that China would not be prepared to be a full initial participant in the plurilateral FTA, but the agreement could be successfully launched even if China were not an initial participant. For the United States, 80% of U. S. manufactured exports could still be included in the initial agreement, with only 8% of manufactured exports going to China thanks to the lopsided bilateral trade account. And China would be welcome as an observer in the plurilateral FTA process.

But China could initially reject any major trade-balancing actions on its part. The United States, however, should then insist on immediate steps by China for exchange rate and trade policy measures that would lead to a substantial decline in the hugely unbalanced bilateral trade relationship. To this end, the United States has considerable trade bargaining leverage, with manufactured imports from China six times larger than U. S. exports to China. The United States would also state its intent, if necessary, to proceed to a GATT Article XV dispute procedure, including interim import sanctions, which would add to the pressure for a prompt, substantial bilateral agreement.

These are the proposals for restoring a balanced, rules-based, and increasingly multilateral trading system. The U. S. leadership role for such a restoration has been a recurring theme throughout the presentation, and it is therefore fitting to conclude with a more in-depth commentary on the indispensable U. S. leadership role if the restoration is to be achieved.

The Indispensable U. S. Leadership Role.

Henry Kissinger’s recent, monumental World Order 13 traces the course of nation state relationships as defined and launched by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, stressing the importance of balanced power relationships to maintain a peaceful, rules-based system of sovereign states. His focus is on political relationships and the tragic wars that occurred when one participant—France, Germany, the Soviet Union—became overly powerful and felt beyond rules-based nation state constraints. The Kissinger book, however, treats economic relationships lightly, and this study therefore constitutes an adjunct work for the economic order as created at Bretton Woods in 1944, a rules-based trade and financial system among nation states, and their often-troubled power relationships that have intensified since 2000. A parallel can indeed be drawn that China, with a $1+ trillion annual trade surplus in manufactures and more than $3 trillion in the central bank, now feels itself beyond rules-based trade and financial constraints.

The Kissinger book also stresses the critical role of leadership for maintaining an orderly nation state system, and is most detailed for the U. S. leadership role during 20th-century hot and cold wars: “American leadership has been indispensable, even when it has been exercised ambivalently.”14 And again, such American leadership has long characterized the course of the Bretton Woods economic system and will remain indispensable for restoring a balanced world economic order in the immediate years ahead.

Restructuring of a balanced, rules-based trading system will center on the Big Three—the United States, China, and the EU—but the other two are beset by overriding national economic interests and lack the forward-looking political vision necessary to confront the serious and likely fatal challenges facing the world economic order. Chinese economic strategy remains heavily committed to a massive trade surplus in technology-intensive industries despite the broader economic goal of restructuring toward domestic service-sector consumption, while a top EU economic priority is to resolve financial crises within the eurozone, which benefits from a large trade surplus with non-members.

In this global political and economic context, U. S. leadership to restore a balanced, rules-based trading system, as proposed here, is indispensable and needs to be based on three integrated dimensions. The first, as introduced earlier, is to restore broadly based, bipartisan political support within the United States, which can only be achieved through a credible trade strategy to greatly reduce the protracted very large trade and current account deficits. Without such broadly based domestic political support, U. S. proposals for fundamental change in the existing trade and financial systems will falter and the national security and commercial interests opposed to such action-oriented change will block serious consideration. And this, in turn, will result in further momentum toward protectionist actions and collapse of what remains of the multilateral system.

The second leadership dimension is that the United States will have to build a coalition of like-minded major trading nations to achieve trade/financial policy integration within a plurilateral FTA as proposed here. U. S. manufactured exports are headed down toward 10% of global exports, and only together with other principal exporters will the FTA strategy come together in trade and financial terms. Such a coalition is eminently feasible, however, given strong U. S. leadership. Within NAFTA, both Canada and Mexico also face exchange rate–related mercantilist competition from Asian exporters, and they already basically adhere to the trade/financial linkage. Likewise for the EU. As for Asians, as explained earlier, Japan, South Korea, and some others could be strongly attracted to ensured duty-free access for exports to the U. S. and other industrialized markets, and thus a more balanced trade relationship with China. Asian positive interest, however, will depend largely on the third dimension of the U. S. leadership challenge, namely a strong and credible U. S. bilateral approach to China for fundamental change of direction for its mercantilist trade and exchange rate policies.

The U. S. strategy for China has been presented in detail in the previous section, but its importance for the overall U. S. leadership role cannot be overstated. It has to be firm and sustained, including the possibility of interim U. S. import sanctions, which would have helpful spillover impact for reducing other Asian currency manipulation. In-depth negotiations with China could also have broader positive political impact, however, through discussion of mutual geo-economic interests by the two global economic superpowers to develop a balanced, rules-based world economic order among sovereign states, with intellectual roots dating back to 1648.

This concludes the presentation of the global restructuring of world trade underway and proposals for restoring a balanced, rules-based multilateral trading system, including the essential U. S. leadership role. It has been pointed and at times provocative in form, in order to stimulate serious discussion during this election year. Let the election debate over the extremely large and growing U. S. trade deficit in technology-intensive manufactures begin!

Ernest Preeg holds a Ph. D. in economics from the New School for Social Research and is currently Senior Advisor for International Trade and Finance at the MAPI Foundation. His engagement with international trade began by sailing from ordinary seaman up to chief mate in the American merchant marine. His government positions included member of the U. S. delegations to the Kennedy and Uruguay Rounds of trade negotiations, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development, Chief Economist at USAID, White House Executive Director of the Economic Policy Group, and American Ambassador to Haiti. His publications include Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The Brookings Institution, 1970); Economic Blocs and U. S. Foreign Policy (National Planning Association, 1974); Traders in a Brave New World: The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System (University of Chicago Press, 1995); The Emerging Chinese Advanced Technology Superstate (MAPI and the Hudson Institute, 2005); India and China: An Advanced Technology Race and How the United States Should Respond (MAPI and CSIS, 2008); Twilight of the Dollar With Technology-Intensive Manufacturing at Center Stage (MAPI, 2018); and The Decline of U. S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures and Its Consequences for the World Economic Order (MAPI, 2017).

1. See Gary Hufbauer, et al., Framework for the International Services Agreement (Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2018)

2. For a more detailed analysis, see Ernest H. Preeg, U. S. Trade Surplus in Business Services Peaks Out (MAPI Foundation, 2017). The briefer presentation here updates the trade figures through 2017, reinforcing the conclusions in the earlier analysis.

3. The definition of manufactures from these sources, SITC 5-8, is slightly broader than the WTO definition, which is SITC 5-8 minus two small sectors that account for less than 5% of U. S. manufactured exports.

4. These trade figures indicate that the U. S. share of global exports of manufactures declined to 12% in 2018. In 2017, as shown in Table 2, the U. S. share was 12.5%, which was rounded up to 13%. In 2018, however, the 3% decline in U. S. exports together with significant export growth by some Asian and other exporters, reduced the 12.5%, with a rounding down to 12% for 2018.

5. The Financial Times , January 27, 2018, "Invoice inflation adds to China capital flight."

6. See Ben Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of the New World Order (Princeton University Press and the Council on Foreign Relations, 2018), p. 33. Harry Dexter White is best known for his personal tragedy when it was revealed toward the end of the Bretton Woods deliberations that he was a Soviet intelligence agent. White had been highly respected and was in line to be the first managing director of the IMF when the scandal broke. Indeed, as a historical footnote, if White and successor Americans had headed the IMF instead of the Europeans who rose to the post-scandal occasion, IMF policy orientation over the decades would likely have been more favorable to the United States, especially as related to exchange rate policy.

7. The State Department was left in the dark about the Nixon shock until the weekend before the Monday public announcement. I was engaged in these issues for a couple of years through the announcement as senior advisor to the under secretary of state for economic affairs, investment banker Nat Samuels, who was on vacation in New England that weekend in an era without cellphones or email. Economics Bureau acting head Jules Katz and I were thus caught in the middle of the highly strained dialogue over the shock announcement to our allies between the White House / Treasury and the equally shocked, NATO-oriented European Bureau at State. Indeed, a memorable weekend!

8. This leadership was always contingent on broadly based bipartisan congressional support. For example, President Kennedy selected former Republican Secretary of State Christian Herter to be the first U. S. Trade Representative, to negotiate the ambitious Kennedy Round. Similar bipartisan support characterized U. S. trade policy for Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton, but is sadly lacking today.

9. From a presentation by Joseph Gagnon, "Comments on the IMF's 2018 External Sector Report," during a meeting on this subject at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 27, 2018.

10. "Will the Dollar Remain the Reserve Currency? Is the rising chorus to replace the dollar a reflection of far deeper problems in the world financial system?" The International Economy , Fall 2017, p. 16-31.

11. See the Treasury Bulletin , Table OFS-2, "Ownership of U. S. Treasury Securities," September 2018.

12. The IMF does not have a dispute mechanism, requiring the WTO route. GATT Article XV, however, calls for full consultation with the IMF.

13. Henry Kissinger, World Order (Penguin Press, 2017).

14. Kissinger, op. cit ., p. 373.

Productivity Dynamics in U. S. Manufacturing: An Industry-Based Analysis.

U. S. Industrial Outlook: Manufacturing Production Growth Is Disappointingly Slow.

MAPI Foundation 1600 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100 Arlington, VA 22209 703-841-9000.

Fair Multilateral System Essential to Sustained Growth for Developing Countries, Second Committee Hears in Debate on International Trade, Development.

“A fair multilateral trading system is essential to ensure sustained growth in global trade and create new market access and opportunities for developing countries,” Malaysia’s representative told the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) today as delegates met to discuss international trade and development.

Thailand’s representative said that a universal, fair, rule-based, open, pro-development, non-discriminatory, inclusive and equitable multilateral trading system could be reached through collective global efforts.

Several delegates called for trade to be part of the post-2018 development agenda. In that context, the representative of the United Arab Emirates noted that the implementation of the sustainable development goals required capacity-building to enable developing countries to set their own trade-boosting policies.

Echoing her view, the representative of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) said that assisting countries to integrate into the multilateral trading system through trade capacity-building was the “main vehicle for social inclusiveness, environmental sustainability and economic competitiveness”.

The Bali Package and Doha Round were frequently mentioned. Ethiopia’s representative called for the development dimension in the Round to be fully realized, and to provide developing countries with the required policy space to achieve their overall development objectives. Jamaica’s representative noted that work remained to be done on the Bali agreement in terms of full implementation and in concluding negotiations in trade in services and the work programme for small vulnerable economies.

Various delegates spoke about the success of their regional trade blocks. Brazil’s representative, on the other hand, warned about the negative aspects of proliferation of bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements, and called for a recommitment to the multilateral trading systems represented by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its agreements. Similarly, China’s representative highlighted multilateral cooperation as the main channel for promoting growth in trade, reducing poverty and achieving economic development.

The special situation of least developed countries was mentioned by several delegates. Benin’s representative was disappointed that integration of such countries into the international trading system had “not yielded significant results”. Namely, they held only 1.11 per cent of global merchandise trade, which was well short of the 2 per cent target for 2020.

While full access to the markets of developed countries was generally available, he noted, the duty-free and quota-free access stipulated by the Doha Development Agenda was not fully implemented. Moreover, least developed countries remained marginalized in South-South trade and needed preferences there as well. The representative of Bangladesh said that Non-Tariff Barriers and Technical Barriers to Trade hampered the fledgling export markets of those countries.

The importance of finding solutions to the challenges faced by landlocked developing countries in accessing international markets was also stressed. Kazakhstan’s representative noted that exports from those countries were considerably more expensive due to the lack of sea access, and the 2018 Almaty Ministerial Declaration proposed the granting of trade preferences within the WTO.

The Committee also continued its debate on the eradication of poverty, during which delegates reiterated the need for that issue to remain at the centre of the post-2018 development agenda. According to India’s representative “the battle against poverty has not been won”, and the fact that one in every six human beings lived in extreme poverty should be “an affront to our collective imagination”.

Mexico’s representative said that economic growth was important to reducing poverty but inequality undermined its effects and the new development agenda had to deliver on inclusion. Tuvalu’s representative stressed that donor countries must confirm their global commitments and ensure common but differentiated responsibilities. At the same time, recipient countries must ensure good governance, accountable leadership, good planning and fiscal prudence, while squashing corruption and incentivizing trade and investments.

The meeting on international trade and development was opened by Ana Maria Menéndez Pérez, President of the Trade and Development Board, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), who introduced the report on the sixty-first session of the Board. The Secretary-General’s report on international trade and development was introduced by Mina Mashayekhi, Head of the Trade Negotiations and Commercial Diplomacy Branch, UNCTAD.

Speaking on international trade and development were representatives of Australia (on behalf of the Cairns Group), Malaysia (on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)), Qatar, Indonesia, India, Morocco, Zambia, Russian Federation and Iran.

Speaking on poverty eradication were representatives of the Sudan, Namibia, Trinidad and Tobago, Qatar, Venezuela, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Tanzania, Ukraine, Nepal, Russian Federation, Zambia, Myanmar, Singapore, Mozambique, Thailand, Togo, Libya, Gabon, Japan, Malta, El Salvador, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Tonga and Canada.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a. m., on 23 October to conclude its discussion of poverty eradication and take up Item 22 of its agenda: Groups of countries in special situations.

The Second Committee (Economic and Financial) met this morning to discuss international trade and development. The Committee had before it several reports (documents A/69/179, A/69/15 (Part I), A/69/15 (Part II), A/69/15 (Part III), A/69/15 (Part IV), and A/C.2/69/2). It also concluded its debate on eradication of poverty.

Introduction of Reports.

ANA MARIA MENÉNDEZ PÉREZ, President of the Trade and Development Board, UNCTAD, introduced a four-part report on the sixty-first session of the Board. The high-level segment had taken place between 15 and 26 September under the theme “Tackling inequality through trade and development: a post-2018 challenge”. Discussions had focused on interdependence, development strategies in a globalized world, and the UNCTAD contribution to the implementation of the Istanbul Programme of Action. Investment in Africa, trends in the international trading system, and the Conference’s assistance to the Palestinian people were also on the agenda. Looking to the sustainable development goals, the Board discussed financing needs.

MINA MASHAYEKHI, Head of the Trade Negotiations and Commercial Diplomacy Branch, UNCTAD, introduced the report of the Secretary-General on international trade and development (document A/69/179). She said that UNCTAD would continue to play a key role as an engine of growth. In a context of a significant transformation of international trade and the trading system, trade should be anchored in the post-2018 development agenda and an opportunity existed to establish new and more effective global trade governance that connected trade with inclusive and sustainable development. The connection between the two would be an important topic for the Lima Conference in 2018.

SHORNA-KAY MARIE RICHARDS (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that the Community remained committed to trade liberalization and had continued to deepen intra-regional trade through the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. Their openness had made them vulnerable to the vagaries of the global economic crisis. CARICOM Governments had found it necessary to enter into standby agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in part to reduce debt burdens and stimulate medium-term economic growth. Due to their precarious economic situation, it was imperative that any trade agreement include a strong development component.

He said that CARICOM had in 2018 adopted the Regional Aid-for-Trade strategy to strengthen capacity to participate in the multilateral trading system. The Community was convinced that an inclusive and transparent multilateral trade system was fundamental to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and that such a system would enable the effective implementation of the Samoa Pathway outcome document. There remained work to be done on the Bali agreement that came out of the Ninth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization, in terms of full implementation of the agreements and in concluding negotiations in trade in services and the work programme for small vulnerable economies.

ALAN GRIFFIN, Member of Parliament, Australia , spoke on behalf of the Cairns Group. He addressed the global imbalances and distortions in world agricultural trade, with the aim of creating more effective price signals for farmers. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that the global population would increase to 9 billion people by 2050, when agricultural production would need to grow by 70 per cent, and in a sustainable way. More investment in agriculture was needed including where food security challenges were prevalent.

Yet the imbalances and distortions in agriculture continued to be much greater than those for industrial goods, he said. The Cairns Group wanted the WTO to deliver concretely in agriculture trade reform, particularly for the most vulnerable member States. It would continue to prioritize its efforts on the pending and outstanding elimination of export subsidies which were “extremely damaging for developing countries”. It was unacceptable that those trade distorting measures remained in agriculture more than half a century after their elimination for industrial products.

HUSSEIN HANIFF ( Malaysia ) spoke on behalf of ASEAN and associated himself with the “Group of 77” developing countries and China. He described recent economic developments in his region and efforts made to deepen regional integration on a range of development matters. Underlining the importance of promoting fiscal soundness for sustainable economic development, he said ASEAN continued to accelerate and deepen economic and structural reforms, promote domestic demand and employment, resist protectionism and promote trade and investment. ASEAN Economics Ministers had met to discuss broad issues related to integration and regional cooperation.

Implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community was progressing, he said, adding that a post-2018 vision had been developed for the Community to follow its formation. Consistent with the region’s intraregional trade, ASEAN States accelerated engagement in regional trade agreements, with the ASEAN-China free trade area emerging as the world’s largest. He reconfirmed commitment to universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trade, which would contribute to global growth and sustainable development. He urged the WTO and UNCTAD to continue monitoring protectionist policies and assessing their impact on developing countries and called for implementation of the Bali Package.

JEAN-FRANCIS ZINSSOU ( Benin ), speaking on behalf of the Group of Least Developed Countries and associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, said integration of least developed countries into the international trading system had “not yielded significant results”. In 1960, least developed countries held 2.5 per cent of global merchandise trade but now held only 1.11 per cent. The current figure was well short of the 2 per cent target for 2020. While full access to markets of developed countries was generally available, the duty-free, quota-free access stipulated by the Doha Development Agenda was not fully implemented. Market access provisions needed improvement, including the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers and simplifying rules, and developed countries should ensure immediate, predictable, duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis to all products originating from least developed countries.

He said that rules of origin needed to be reformed to reflect the modern commercial world, especially given the failure to implement the Bali decision on preferential rules of origin. The service sector had potential, with exports for least developed countries doubling between 2005 and 2018. Nonetheless, commercial services accounted for just 10 per cent of total exports — half the global average. The erosion of preferences and lost tariff revenue had increased adjustment costs faced by least developed countries. While many exports from least developed countries enjoyed duty-free, quota-free access to developed markets, so did exports from other developing countries, meaning least developed countries did not really receive preference. Least developed countries remained marginalized in South-South trade and needed preferences there, too. It was also important to improve trade capacity-building through aid for trade, and to eliminate trade distorting agricultural subsidies in developed countries. Modern technology was needed, as was a change in the intellectual property regime. The decision by the WTO Council to extend the transition period of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was welcome and least developed countries should receive fast-tracking of WTO membership.

HAMAD BIN ABDULAZIZ AL-KUWARI, Minister for Culture, Arts and Heritage of Qatar , said he was proud of what had been accomplished at Doha and since then. While today’s world was very different from that in 1964, flux, change and challenge remained part of the multilateral landscape. While those processes were economic in substance, they were also clearly political in nature. Thus, achieving tangible and sustainable results and agreements would only be possible by arriving at a political consensus. He also highlighted the link between culture and sustainable development, and between economic and cultural development.

The language of multilateralism in recent years had been one of confrontation, he said, calling for a new culture of multilateral relations. “We have to find a new way of doing things that will build bridges even across what may seem to be intractable positions”, he said, as “today’s problems are too vast, and the stakes too high, to content ourselves with the status quo”. In that context, Qatar would support a series of initiatives aimed at changing the negotiating culture in UNCTAD to strengthen its deliverables, “through cooperation rather than confrontation”, and “through understanding and compassion rather than through dogmatism and aggression”.

OTTO RIADI ( Indonesia ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China and with ASEAN, said that unfavourable elements of the 2007-2008 financial crisis had generated pressure on his country’s economy, most notably the trade and financial channels. Regionally, certain factors dampened growth and future trade, including the problem of corruption. Of the region’s developing economies, 40 per cent ranked in the bottom third of Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index. The Doha Round negotiation of the WTO should continue to be supported, including the full implementation of the Bali Package. At the 2018 International Conference on Financing for Development, financing for South-South trade should be included as one of the issues to be discussed.

TENGKU MOHD DZARAIF KADIR ( Malaysia ), aligning himself with the Group of 77 and China, and the ASEAN, said that it was time to ensure that developing countries were able to engage in international trade and that the WTO had an important role in ensuring economic growth through a liberalized, transparent and predictable global trading environment. As of September 2018, his country’s total trade had expanded by 4.2 per cent compared to the same month in 2018. Moreover, its global exports had risen by 5.6 per cent in the same period. He looked forward to an expeditious conclusion of the Doha Round, as it would help to reduce protectionist measures and contribute to more equitable and inclusive growth. International trade was an engine for development and a fair multilateral trading system was “essential to ensure sustained growth in global trade and create new market access and opportunities for developing countries”.

AMIT NARANG ( India ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, said that trade and investment, and an open, rules-based, transparent and non-discriminatory WTO-based trading system could play an important role in restoring global growth. The increasing fragmentation in favour of regional and “plurilateral” processes was a challenge to the centrality and credibility of the multilateral trading system. At the same time, the international trading regime must be made more equitable and development-oriented in order for developing countries to benefit from it. He called for the conclusion of the Doha Round as per its development mandate, which was about “creating new opportunities and economic growth for developing countries in all sectors”. His country remained committed to the Bali decisions. However, food security must be treated with the same urgency as other issues, as it was central to eradicating poverty.

ABDELLAH BEN MELLOUK ( Morocco ) called for a solution to end the current stagnation and blockage of the implementation of the Bali Package. Trade was a determining factor in growth and development and an essential source of financing for development. As such, it should be the key pillar of the post-2018 agenda. The participation of developing countries in the world trade and South-South trade was increasing, with the latter accounting for one quarter of the world’s goods exports. However, Africa had not benefited from that trade as much as it could have. Therefore, its special needs and a number of obstacles must be addressed, including challenges in the areas of infrastructure and structural transformation.

YOSEPH KASSAYE ( Ethiopia ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, said the development dimension in the Doha Round of negotiations must be fully realized, and provide developing countries the required policy space to achieve their overall development objectives. It was paramount to find solutions to the challenges faced by landlocked developing countries, particularly in accessing international markets. His country focused on increasing the benefits of trade by integrating itself into the multilateral trading system. To achieve that objective, it was raising efficiency and competitiveness of the trading sector, strengthening domestic and foreign investment and trade, establishing a favourable environment for investors, and strengthening the transparency, fairness and accountability of the legal framework for trade activities.

KHAULA ALI KHAMIS OBAID ALSHAMSI ( United Arab Emirates ) called for reform of international trade to make it more multilateral, calling for more preferential treatment to be given to least developed countries. Trade should be part of the post-2018 agenda and implementation of the sustainable development goals required capacity building to enable developing countries to set their own policies to boost trade. In that regard, official development assistance (ODA) and technology transfer commitments had to be upheld. To boost participation in international trade, more effort was needed to ensure implementation of the post-Bali programme of action. External trade was a major source of her country’s income and she spoke against protectionism, noting her involvement in several international trade instruments. She noted cooperation with African countries, as well as work at home to improve infrastructure for foreign direct investment.

WALUBITA IMAKANDO ( Zambia ), aligning himself with the Group of 77 and China and the African Group, noted the many international trade arrangements his country was part of which increased access to markets. Despite the expanding role of developing countries in international trade and the growth of South-South cooperation, constraints continued to “impede the country’s ability to fully utilize preferential trade arrangements”. Inadequate infrastructure and low productivity hampered the country’s ability to produce in quantities demanded and to the standards set by international trading community. Measures had been implemented to improve the business environment and enhance competitiveness, notably the Private Sector Development Reform Programme. He applauded UNCTAD for implementing the Enhanced Integrated Framework in developing countries and said Zambia conformed to it by mainstreaming trade into national development plans and strategies; ensuring coordinated delivery of trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building; and addressing supply-side constraints.

YAOWALUK SUTHIMANUS ( Thailand ), associating herself with the Group of 77 and China and ASEAN, said that at the national level, the promotion of free trade remained the cornerstone of trade and development policy. Pleased that the proposed sustainable development goals included trade-related means of implementation, her Government believed that through collective global efforts, a universal, fair, rule-based, open, pro-development, non-discriminatory, inclusive and equitable multilateral trading system was possible. Special and differential provisions as included in all the WTO agreements had to be given to developing countries to enable them to retain adequate policy space for social and economic development.

HONGBO WANG ( China ) said that as the international development agenda was in a critical period of transition, global economic governance needed to be improved without delay. Some economies were at risk from being excluded from the global value chain through priority in trade negotiations moving from trade in goods to investment protection and from customs measures to domestic regulatory measures. Multilateral cooperation was the main channel for promoting the growth of trade, reducing poverty in the world and achieving economic development. Convinced that the integration of the world economy was the trend in today’s world, her Government was ready to strengthen cooperation with UNCTAD in an effort to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development in the world.

A. K. ABDUL MOMEN ( Bangladesh ) associated himself with the Group of 77 and China and the Group of Least Developed Countries. He said that though trade provided a lift to an economy, it was an area where least developed countries were most vulnerable. In the last four decades, the total share of least developed countries in global trade had hovered around 1 per cent. “Business as usual” was not going to improve the situation. While most developed countries had fulfilled commitments made at the 2005 WTO Ministerial Meeting to provide duty-free, quota-free market access to the least developed countries, he said that some still had yet to fulfil on their pledges. Non-Tariff Barriers and Technical Barriers to Trade hampered the fledgling export markets of least developed countries.

TATIANA ZVEREVA ( Russian Federation ) underlined her consistent support for establishing a fair system where all parties complied with international decisions. She supported the Bali Package and reaffirmed her country’s commitment to combat protectionism. In line with support for integration of the global economy, she pointed to the Eurasian Economic Union between the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan and welcomed the accession of Armenia to the Union. The Union would remove barriers to trade in goods and create a single market for goods, labour and capital. It was based on WTO rules and principles and turnover in the area had increased in the previous three years. Based on recommendations by UNCTAD, the World Bank and other international institutions, the Russian Federation was working to improve conditions for doing business at home. She trusted that UNCTAD would continue playing the role of coordinator in the international trading system.

Ms. YESHMAGAMBETOVA ( Kazakhstan ) recalled the tenth Asia-Europe Meeting Summit when her country had stressed the need for a paradigm shift for international cooperation and to take action in eliminating protectionist trade barriers. Kazakhstan was working to become a member of the WTO to maximize the liberal access of local products to world markets. Another State programme of industrial-innovative development was recently adopted with the aim of diversifying the economy and the development of high tech industry. Exports from landlocked developing countries were considerably more expensive due to the lack of sea access, and among its many recommendations, the 2018 Almaty Ministerial Declaration proposed the granting of trade preferences within the WTO.

FERNANDO SARDENBERG ZELNER GONÇALVES ( Brazil ) said the third Conference on Financing for Development would provide ample opportunities to discuss macroeconomic policies and trade as real drivers of development. With the Open Working Group recognizing trade as means of implementation for sustainable development, he highlighted the need for a stable, transparent and rules-based multilateral trade system. Since the 2008 financial crisis, major trading partners had turned away from the multilateral system and embarked on a “worrisome path” of additional rules specific to large trading blocks. Regionally managed trade could not be compatible with and supportive of a global integrated economy. In view of the proliferation of bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements, which shut off developing countries, he urged the international community to recommit to the multilateral trading systems represented by the WTO and its agreements.

ALI HAJILARI ( Iran ) associated with the Group of 77 and China, stressing the importance of an international enabling environment to ensure that envisaged transformative change took place in several areas. Trade had to be addressed as it was a powerful driver and enabler for growth, employment and poverty eradication. Capacity-building was linked closely to enhancing balanced productive development strategies, including through a universal, fair, rules-based, open, pro-development, non-discriminatory, inclusive and equitable multilateral trading system. Accession to the WTO should be facilitated and there should be no political impediments. Trade barriers, trade-distorting subsidies in developed countries and other measures were a matter of concern. The Group of 77 and China had affirmed “their firm rejection of the imposition of laws and regulation with extraterritorial impact and all other forms of coercive economic measures, including unilateral sanctions, against [several] developing countries,” and reiterated the urgent need to eliminate them immediately.

RALF BREDEL, UNIDO, said that the integration of countries with small economies into regional and global markets promised expanded demand for their goods, and fostered job creation and income generation. Trade capacity-building, with the development of quality infrastructure as its key element, was crucial, especially for least developed and landlocked developing countries. It remained among the cornerstones of the work of UNIDO, and was an integral feature of virtually all its technical cooperation programmes. “Assisting Member States to integrate into the multilateral trading system through trade capacity-building is a main vehicle for social inclusiveness, environmental sustainability and economic competitiveness,” he said.

Mr. OSMAN ( Sudan ), aligning his delegation with the “Group of 77” and China, the Arab and African Groups and the Group of Least Developed Countries, said that climate changes greatly exacerbated the impact of the many challenges developing countries faced, including poverty, food security and unemployment. In pursuit of the goals of the United Nations Second Decade for Poverty Eradication, his Government had invested in public services and had sought to consolidate the role of women. Foreign investment was being encouraged, and access to microcredit expanded. A social support initiative had been launched for the most marginalized groups. Poverty was worsened in Sudan by abandonment of traditional agricultural practices, lack of production capacity and desertification, all of which were worsened by the debt burden. He called for lifting of unilateral economic sanctions to aid efforts to fight poverty.

AMIT NARANG ( India ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, said “the battle against poverty has not been won”, and the fact that one in every six human beings lived in extreme poverty should be “an affront to our collective imagination”. His Government had launched a National Mission on Financial Inclusion with the objective of covering all households in the country with banking facilities and having a bank account for each household. Through that initiative, it hoped to break the vicious cycle between poverty and debt, and unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of people to be able to chart their own destinies. His country also remained committed to the promotion of gender equality, and to utilizing information and communications technology for the empowerment of women.

WILFRIED I. EMVULA ( Namibia ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, and the African Group, said poverty eradication must remain central in the planning and implementation of the sustainable development goals. The global trade and investment rules must be designed to meet the constraints faced by developing countries. The impasse in the Doha Development Round which had negatively impacted development, the fight against poverty and the “Aid for Trade” initiatives was of concern. The recent financial volatility was a reminder of the need to reform the global financial system and ensure a greater voice and participation by developing countries. He also called for women to be at the centre of development and welcomed the proposals for a stand-alone goal on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in the post-2018 agenda.

EDEN CHARLES ( Trinidad and Tobago ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, and CARICOM, said that his Government had implemented a number of programmes aimed at eradicating poverty. They included the provision of social assistance to poor and vulnerable groups, the Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programme aimed at providing social protection by promoting nutritional and food security among vulnerable households, the National Social Development Programme, the Poverty Reduction Programme, and the Micro Enterprise Training and Development Grant. Also instituted were a number of initiatives in support of advancing women’s role in development, resulting in their strong presence in the non-agriculture sector, accompanied by a diminishing gap in labour force participation between men and women. Also introduced were efforts geared toward addressing the “gendered digital divide”.

Ms. AL-FADALAH ( Qatar ), associating herself with the Group of 77 and China, stressed that, in line with the goals of the Second Decade, the priorities of countries should be to promote productive work, especially for the youth, improving agricultural productivity and improving the livelihoods of the poor. She stressed her country’s commitment to eliminating discrimination against women and pointed to Qatar’s hosting of the third meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement on the advancement of women. In Qatar, policies to enable women focused on the family. Focus on them would help in the fight against poverty. There were advances in improving the status of women, with efforts to provide a higher level of education among measures. Girls outnumbered boys in primary education, with efforts also aimed at the labour market and to reduce practices like early marriage. Qatar ranked thirty-sixth in the human development index and had the tenth highest level of education in the world.

HENRY ALFREDO SUÁREZ MORENO ( Venezuela ), aligned with the Group of 77 and China, pointed to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on poverty, which showed some unnerving trends like the vulnerability of 15 per cent of the world’s population to multidimensional poverty. Around half of the world’s labour force held informal or vulnerable employment, in contravention of International Labour Organization (ILO) guidelines on safe and decent work. Poverty was complex and tackling it required a multidimensional approach. Poverty should not be defined on the basis of income levels alone and successful strategies for combating it showed the need to go beyond income. Poor people were given free access to health care, cheaper food, lower interest on credit and other benefits to support their daily minimum income. Education was fundamental, as was the provision of productive jobs, and assistance to the vulnerable.

HYDER AL-ALWAN ( Iraq ) stressed the importance of the industrial sector to his country’s economy. He noted several structural problems that had caused difficulties in the industry and led to the sector’s decline in the country, reducing gross domestic product (GDP). It was important to provide assistance to countries that were making efforts to eradicate poverty. Developed countries had to commit and he welcomed the involvement of UNIDO, while also looking to the potential benefits of South-South cooperation. He described several areas in which efforts to strengthen the economy had been made and described industrial and mining projects. The aim was to promote profitable public enterprises and several policies had also been enacted to make the investment climate in Iraq more business friendly to encourage local and international investment.

FREDERICK M. M. SHAVA ( Zimbabwe ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China, said that his Government had adopted policies and programmes aimed at economically empowering its citizens. The most notable was the historic land reform programme which had seen more than 300,000 households being allocated land. Agriculture was critical to lifting countries out of poverty, and it contributed 30 per cent of the GDP during a good season. Trade was another factor that could help poor nations grow their way out of poverty, and the elimination of trade protection policies by developed countries was vital. Zimbabwe’s poverty alleviation initiatives continued to be hampered by the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States, he said, calling for their immediate and unconditional lifting.

ZAKIA EL-MIDAOUI ( Morocco ), associating herself with the Group of 77 and China, the African Group, and the Group of Friends of Financial Inclusion, said the debate on poverty eradication and other development-related issues illustrated that the world must “pull together” to enable all countries take advantage of the opportunities of development and the fruits of globalization. Her country had launched a national human development initiative that, among others things, aimed to combat poverty in rural areas and social exclusion in urban areas. A national human development observatory had been established to assess the impact of public policy on human development indicators. Other initiatives that were contributing to combatting poverty and vulnerability included a medical assistance regime for the poorest populations that were not covered by mandatory health insurance.

TUVAKO N. MANONGI ( United Republic of Tanzania ), aligning himself with the Group of 77 and China, and the African States, said poverty eradication should remain at the centre of the United Nations deliberations. It was unacceptable for children under five and pregnant women to continue to die due to poverty related causes, as it was incomprehensible that the world had over one billion people who could not read and write, and who practiced open defecation. Commitments made towards developing countries including the least developed countries, would have to be fulfilled. Three of four people in rural areas lived in extreme poverty, which deserved our amplified attention in the post-2018 development agenda. It was estimated that one billion people lived in slum conditions in urban areas.

SARA LUNA CAMACHO ( Mexico ), aligning herself with the Group for Financial Inclusion, called for a rethink on the way poverty was approached. In the context of the Open Working Group, Mexico had pushed for a multidimensional vision of poverty that looked beyond measurements of per capita income. Economic growth was important to reducing poverty but inequality undermined its effects. The new goals and development agenda had to deliver on inclusion. She would continue promoting disaggregation in monitoring the goals with a view to reducing inequality and ensuring that the agenda served everyone. The type of policies that were needed included income protection programmes, as well as provision of greater access to social services, particularly health care, education and nutrition. The Open Working Group’s report pointed in the right direction and the post-2018 agenda had to promote inclusive growth.

YAROSLAV GOLITSYN ( Ukraine ) welcomed national initiatives to speed up progress toward the Millennium Development Goals and to push for full employment and decent work for all. To be effective, international programmes for poverty eradication had to be mirrored by national efforts, policies and strategies. Poverty eradication was at the centre of Ukraine’s development agenda and the Government had joined with national and international stakeholders to foster pro-poor growth through employment and opportunities for the most vulnerable. Women and youth were the focus of the State poverty eradication programme. As well, Ukraine had launched projects to support social sector reform. European standards of gender equality had been adopted, with women’s leadership promoted and discrimination combated.

SEWA LAMSAL ADHIKARI ( Nepal ), associating herself with the Group of 77 and China and the Group of Least Developed Countries, said that poverty eradication should be at the top of the post-2018 development agenda. Best use should be made of lessons learned from implementation of the Millennium Development Goals and the impacts of the global economic and financial crisis. Least developed countries like Nepal needed modern technology to transform socioeconomic development, as well as enhanced and sustained financial support. Noting that ODA to her country had risen to a record high, she nonetheless called on partners who had not done so to meet their target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income. Her country placed value on debt relief, market access, capacity building and technical support, including transfer of technology with supportive and fair financial architecture and an international trading system for sustainable development.

PAVEL A. FONDUKOV ( Russian Federation ) said that poverty eradication remained a priority and a precondition for achieving sustainable development. Moreover, progress in achieving that goal must be made more equal across countries and regions. His country was consistently stepping up its efforts aimed at poverty eradication, and saw industrial development as a key factor in those endeavours. In that context, it was implementing, together with UNIDO, a number of projects, such as creating agro-industrial parks and improving industrial statistics. He called on all parties to expand cooperation within UNIDO, and to share best practices in the field of sustainable development.

WALUBITA IMAKANDO (Zambia), associating himself with the “Group of 77” and China, said his Government had implemented multiple poverty interventions, among them a scaling up of the Social Cash transfer Scheme this year to over 145,000 individuals being supported, 80 per cent of them women. His country remained committed to other social safety nets, including the Women Empowerment Programme, the Food Security Pack, and the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme. Financial lending institutions had been engaged to provide women entrepreneurs access to affordable financing. Aimed at significantly boosting economic growth, rural industrialization, and employment creation, Zambia had focused on micro, small and medium scale enterprises. The Industrialization and Job Creation Strategy was aimed at facilitating the creation of 1 million formal jobs over the next five years in the agricultural, construction, manufacturing and tourism sectors.

YIN PO MYAT ( Myanmar ), associating herself with the Group of 77 and China, ASEAN and the Group of Least Developed Countries, said that rural development was vital to achieving her country’s poverty reduction objective of 16 per cent by 2018. Furthermore, to achieve the goals of the Istanbul Programme of Action for least developed countries, Myanmar had begun the internal process for graduation from that category. She called on development partners to assist by fulfilling their commitments. She also called upon the United Nations to strengthen system-wide policy coherence on poverty and employment issues within the framework of the second United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty and stressed the importance of regional cooperation in such areas as sharing best practices, technology transfer and economic integration and liberalization as a means to raise people out of poverty.

AUNESE MAKOI SIMATI ( Tuvalu ), associating himself with the Group of Least Developed Countries, said the economic gaps between rich and poor countries and inequalities within nations must be thoroughly addressed. That would aim to remedy the situation where 10 per cent of the population owned 75 per cent of the global wealth. Poverty eradication was best tackled cooperatively between donors and recipients. Donor countries must confirm their global commitments and ensure common but differentiated responsibilities, whilst recipient countries must ensure good governance, accountable leadership, good planning and fiscal prudence, while squashing corruption and incentivizing trade and investments. Science, research and entrepreneurial development were key drivers of poverty alleviation and sustainable development, and research results and information must be shared and made accessible and affordable to the poor.

ONG KOK WEE ( Singapore ), aligning his statement with the Group of 77 and China, and the ASEAN, said that while much had been achieved in fighting poverty, progress had been uneven and there remained a sense that inequality was widening around the world. His Government’s approach to poverty eradication was to create good quality jobs through economic growth. Equal educational opportunities sought to ensure that all children were given the opportunities, skills, and training to pursue their aspirations. Through the Singapore Cooperation Programme, his country trained thousands of Government officials from other countries, and through other collaboration, technical assistance was provided.

ANTÓNIO GUMENDE ( Mozambique ) associated himself with the Group of 77 and China and the African Group. He said that his country had enjoyed eight consecutive years of growth in GDP above 6 per cent as a result of having adopted a national development approach that gave priority to poverty reduction through economic growth, improved social safety nets, ensuring sustainable growth and strengthening good governance. In addition, a District Development Fund aimed at promoting initiatives to boost food production and job creation, including vocational training and entrepreneurship for young people was in place. The decentralization of decision-making on such issues as human and financial resources provided by that Fund had led to an increase in agricultural production, the diversification of local diets and a growing number of artisanal industries. Thus decentralization and empowerment of local communities had proved to be an efficient and effective approach to poverty eradication.

RATHANAND VICHAIDIT ( Thailand ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China and ASEAN, said that it was important to remain focused on the final push for the Millennium Development Goals, in particular the unrealized Goals. There were several underlying, cross-cutting issues fundamental to poverty eradication. Empowering the most vulnerable could ensure sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth. While all countries had to do their utmost to eradicate poverty and fulfil their development objectives, those efforts could and should be further advanced through global partnerships and assistance.

KOUMÉALO ANATE BALLI ( Togo ), aligning her delegation with the Group of 77 and China, the African Group and the Group of Least Developed Countries, pointed out that women were more active in the Togolese workforce than men. However, they tended to occupy marginal positions, lacking access to means of production and to social redistribution. The Government was working hard to ensure women their rightful place in nation-building efforts. There was a particular focus on women in rural areas, and the Government supported projects to ensure women had tools. About 45,000 women were being assisted with tools like power tillers, maize husking machines and mills. Around 100 women’s groups had been fitted out with agricultural material and processing material. Women were also being given training in cooperatives, animal and plant production techniques, managing loans and savings and other important skills.

OMAR A. A. ANNAKOU ( Libya ), associating his delegation with the Group of 77 and China and the African Group, stressed that African countries suffered particularly from poverty even though the population living in extreme poverty had declined greatly between 1990 and 2018. Inequality had grown, however, while ODA continued to drop and negotiations on a multilateral trade system stalled. The international community had to respond to lessons learned from the Millennium Development Goals and the economic and financial crisis, making efforts commensurate with the challenges. Women’s roles in development differed between countries and they assumed many tasks despite facing many obstacles. There was unequal progress on the Millennium Development Goal related to women. In Libya, women’s participation in politics had improved, with them holding 32 seats out of 200 in Parliament, as well as six seats on the body drafting the new Constitution.

MARIANNE ODETTE BIBALOU ( Gabon ), aligning with the Group of 77 and China and the African Group, said a billion people lived in poverty, with women and children particularly affected. Many more were on the very threshold of poverty. The international community had to step up efforts to eradicate poverty in all forms. Job creation, especially for young people, was vital. Youth unemployment was at heart of socio-political upheavals and it often fuelled extremism. Work and employment were vital, but sustained economic growth remained important. Industrialization was a critical tool for growth and structural reform also vital in moving towards a service economy. A focus on women was needed because they were especially affected by poverty, particularly because of cultural and religious reasons that intensified their marginalization.

NOBORU SEKIGUCHI ( Japan ) said his country aimed to create “a society in which women shine” and had recently hosted the World Assembly for Women to promote their full and dynamic participation. Globally, many “abhorrent circumstances” persisted, with women lacking access to basic services like water and energy. That disproportionately increased their workload for no other reason than they were born a woman. Human rights violations against women should no longer occur in the twenty-first century and fundamental rights should be ensured everywhere. Action was needed by the United Nations and the international community to ensure equal participation of girls and boys in school, medical care for expectant mothers, and that no woman or girl lived in fear of violence. Japan was promoting universal health coverage worldwide, believing it was “never too early” to aim for its achievement. He cited a fivefold increase in contributions to UN-Women and looked forward to the establishment of UN-Women’s Tokyo office.

CHRISTOPHER GRIMA ( Malta ) said that any reference, recommendation or commitment to rights and services in connection with reproductive health care should not in any way create an obligation on any party to consider abortion as a legitimate form of reproductive health or rights or commodities. Committed to having more women in decision-making positions, his Government had adopted the strategy of gender mainstreaming to develop a holistic approach towards equality. The economic independence of women and their increased participation in the labour market was a priority, and tax credits, subsidized childcare, and an increase in the number of weeks of paid maternity leave were among a number of family-friendly measures undertaken to facilitate women’s economic independence.

RUBEN ZAMORA ( El Salvador ), aligning himself with the Group of 77 and China, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, said the last effects of the economic crisis had led to slow growth and more restrictions on international financing, affecting developing countries in particular. His country had been promoting sustainable development, as well as tackling poverty, reducing inequality, and advocating an agenda that focused on human rights. By 2018 the percentage of homes facing poverty in El Salvador was 28.9 percent which represented an 11.6 per cent reduction from 2018. Recently the country had approved the Law of Development and Social Protection, which for the first time included a network of policies and strategies focused on the most vulnerable of the population. Despite national efforts, more needed to be done, he said, reiterating the importance of adequate and effective implementation measures, and a global partnership to promote jobs and decent work for all. Full employment and decent work for all were critical elements in the post-2018 development goals.

LU YUHUI (China), associated himself with the Group of 77 and China, said that poverty, one of the most daunting challenges today, was the common responsibility of the international community as a whole. The situation around the globe did not warrant optimism. Efforts would have to focus on making poverty eradication the core of the post-2018 development agenda. It would be necessary to implement inclusive and economic social policies, such as social security and health systems, compulsory education, and equal rights for women, children, older persons and people with disabilities. It would also be necessary to provide concrete assistance to developing countries who faced the greatest challenges in fighting poverty. Industrial development cooperation played a crucial role in raising the productivity of a country. China would work closely with Member States to pursue a path to industrialization. His country had already achieved seven Millennium Development Goals, and had overcome various difficulties, including lifting the living standard of its people.

A. K. ABDUL MOMEN ( Bangladesh ), aligning himself with the Group of 77 and China and with the Group of Least Developed Countries, said that of the two poorest regions in the world, South Asia had, “however unevenly”, moved forward in reducing the number of poor people and was expected to meet Millennium Development Goal One. The global community would have to work closely to ensure that the projection would meet reality. Unemployment, which could be addressed through education, was a major obstacle to eradicating poverty. Climate change was another key factor as it was estimated that environmental degradation would lead to 1.9 billion more people entering into extreme poverty by 2050. A strong industrial base could go a long way towards helping a country eradicate poverty, particularly a least developed country. Bangladesh had attached great importance to the vital role of women in development and since 2009, the number of women entrepreneurs in the country had quadrupled.

NANZEGUELA KONE-FOFANA ( C ôte d’Ivoire ), aligning herself with the Group of 77 and China and the African Group, noted that several developing countries would not achieve the Millennium Development Goals. With poverty eradication a serious concern, the Government had been determined to achieve the Goals and adopted a national development plan in 2018. The plan included a national employment policy, as well as significant efforts to improve education and health care. In the latter field, mothers and children had access to free health care and children received free malaria treatment up to the age of five. Efforts under the plan had improved the lives of tens of thousands, particularly in rural areas. Women’s empowerment was also important and policies were in place on their economic integration and to uphold their rights. She stressed the importance of subregional and regional integration and noted energy connections with Mali, Guinea and Liberia, as well as international transport connections that boosted trade, industrialization and access to markets.

TEVITA SUKA MANGISI ( Tonga ), associating himself with the Group of 77 and China and the Group of Pacific Small Island Developing States, said that the Millennium Development Goals had been the most successful anti-poverty initiative in history. The term “hardship” more accurately conveyed the situation in his country than the word “poverty”, as the population generally had access to food and shelter. The negative effects of climate change posed a threat to poverty reduction efforts. Ecosystem losses could translate directly into economic losses, and poverty eradication could thus not be decoupled from the climate change issue, a problem which disproportionately affected his country.

Ms. MCKENZIE ( Canada ), stating that she would keep it to the point, associated her delegation with the Group of Friends on Financial Inclusion.

Daily Noon Briefing.

22 كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2017.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is again calling urgently upon the Government of Australia to find humane solutions for the refugees and asylum-seekers abandoned on Manus Island, noting that about 800 people have remained in a precarious situation there since the “off-shore processing” facility was closed on 31 October.